Archer Aviation, the Nikola of the Skies

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• Archer Aviation (Nasdaq: ACHR, “Archer”) has built a reputation as a leading publicly traded eVTOL company through misleading projections and PR, reminiscent of Nikola’s tactics.
• Our in-depth analysis, conducted with eVTOL engineers, scrutinizes all major players and finds Archer’s Midnight aircraft fundamentally flawed and likely uncertifiable. In contrast, their competitor Joby Aviation (“Joby”) is making tangible and impressive progress on all fronts.
• Site visits to Archer’s “state-of-the-art” Covington, Georgia manufacturing facility in June, July and August 2025 showed little to no production activity. This comes despite claims of current production along with current scaling to production of 50 aircraft per year and a final goal of 650 aircraft per year with support from Stellantis.
• Archer’s “$6B” order book is inflated with questionable and fraudulent commitments:
  • Air Chateau’s Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for 100 Midnights (valued at up to $500M) is implausible. The UAE operator, with only one helicopter purchased in November 2023, lacks the scale or capital for such a fleet. Our findings also lead us to think that Air Chateau is now defunct.
  • Future Flight Global’s “up to 116” Midnight order is tied to a shell company with no operational track record.
  • KakaoMobility’s 50-aircraft commitment fell apart after Archer failed to deliver for a Q4 2024 demo in Goheung, Korea, yet the order remains included in the backlog.
  • The U.S. Air Force’s “up to $148M” Agility Prime contract has only awarded $33M, with just $744,796 disbursed, and the $110M firm-fixed-price portion delivered only $1.3M in awards so far.
• Archer’s UAE “Launch Edition” was nothing more than a staged hover at a photo-op location, using an obsolete aircraft recycled for marketing. The choice of venue, lack of real test data, and diversion of scarce engineering resources all underscore that this was a PR stunt, not a meaningful step toward certification or commercialization. The company also claimed to have delivered their first Midnight aircraft there. Yet they remain the sole owner of this aircraft that has now supposedly been delivered two times.
• Archer’s recent “Defense” pivot is a desperate attempt to stay in the race, but the company lacks the resources and capacity to be a credible player in that field.

Introduction

Archer has built a fundamentally uncompetitive and uncertifiable aircraft. To begin this report, we present an extensive technical analysis of how the timelines announced by the company are farcical and how poorly their Midnight aircraft performs and compares to peers. That entire chapter was written in collaboration with a team of experts working in the eVTOL sector and with extensive experience in the helicopter and defense sector. What we present in the first chapter led to a logical conclusion, the highly touted and recently highlighted manufacturing facility in Georgia appears almost idle, with only a few dozen cars on the parking lot on the days we monitored it. To mask these multiple engineering and technical failures, the company has announced massive deals, supposedly amounting to $6 billion in future orders. In the last chapter, we uncovered that a significant portion of these deals is made out of thin air through several bogus counterparts. We also address the ridiculous “Abu Dhabi Launch” and claim of aircraft delivery to the UAE, which is the last iteration of Archer’s deceptive and misleading marketing strategy. Finally, we analyze Archer’s reactive pivot into defense and find there to be a high risk and competitive dead end to what is an overestimated and overstated market opportunity.

Table of Contents

For our readers’ convenience, we made this report index with clickable links to the relevant section of interest.

Core Technical Failure      Part I: Obfuscated Certification Progress on Farcical Timelines      Part II: Out-Engineered and Outmaneuvered:           Noise Levels           Other Design Red Flags           Midnight Lacks Any Competitive Advantage The Domino Effect on Production      Part III: The Empty Factory A Marketing Façade as a Cover-Up      Part IV: The $6 Billion Mirage      Part V: The Abu Dhabi “Launch” and “Delivery” Future Direction of the eVTOL Market Participants      Part VI: Overplayed Defense Opportunities and Underestimated Competition is Archer’s Dead End      Part VII: The eIPP Favors Joby Over Archer

Core Technical Failure

We begin this first chapter with a section on the certification timeline. We believe it to be the most important aspect of this business, as the first eVTOL company to obtain certification will be able to start commercial operations ahead of competitors, a clear advantage. But the path to certification also demonstrates the capabilities of a company and its trustworthiness regarding its promises to investors and its operational execution over time. As we also mentioned in our previous report on Archer, the company’s strongest feature is its marketing strategy and how it presents itself to investors, not its actual operations. We explain in detail why.

Part I: Obfuscated Certification Progress on Farcical Timelines

Type certification by a reputable regulator is mandatory and underpins the business model of Joby and Archer. To those unaware of the monumental effort to type certify an aircraft, it is worth noting a few case studies that we present in this section.

Before we compare Archer’s Midnight aircraft against these case studies, it is important to remind Archers Shareholder Letter history and what the current ‘Midnight’ was meant to do, and now is doing for the company:

Baseline (Q4 2022): The Original Promise

Aircraft Promise: To build 6+ conforming aircraft.

Testing Promise: To begin flight testing in early 2024.

Q1 2023: The Goal Shrinks

Aircraft Status: DOWNGRADED. The goal was revised from “6+” to just “6” but still
described as conforming aircraft.

Testing Status: NO CHANGE. The “early 2024” flight testing target was maintained.

Q2 2023: Holding Pattern

Aircraft Status: NO CHANGE. The goal remained at “6” conforming aircraft.

Testing Status: NO CHANGE. The “early 2024” flight testing target was still being maintained.

Q3 2023: The First Delay

Aircraft Status: NO CHANGE. The goal remained at “6” conforming aircraft.

Testing Status: DELAYED. The flight-testing target was pushed back from “early 2024” to mid-2024.

Q4 2023: The Language Shifts

Aircraft Status: DOWNGRADED. The commitment changed from “building 6” to having “3 conforming aircraft in progress, 6 planned”.

Testing Status: INFORMATION GAP. The “mid-2024” target was no longer mentioned, presumably because Archer saw it was under threat (later realized).

Q1 2024: Stagnation

Aircraft Status: NO CHANGE. The status remained at “3 conforming aircraft in progress, 6 planned”.

Testing Status: INFORMATION GAP. The previous “mid-2024” target was again not mentioned.

Q2 2024: Still No Progress

Aircraft Status: NO CHANGE. The company reported the same status: “3 conforming aircraft in progress, 6 planned”.

Testing Status: INFORMATION GAP. The “mid-2024” target remained unmentioned.

Q3 2024: Miss

Aircraft Status: DOWNGRADED. The goal of building “conforming” aircraft was replaced with a new focus on “piloted, type-design aircraft”, a subtle change that does not describe whether the aircraft are conforming or non-conforming. What even is a “type-design aircraft”?

Testing Status: MISSED. The “mid-2024” flight testing window for conformal aircraft had now passed.

Q4 2024: Non-Conformal Admission

Aircraft Status: DOWNGRADED. The plan changed to manufacturing up to 10 Midnight Aircraft in 2025, planning to deliver first piloted Midnight aircraft to the UAE. The caveat: Earnings Call elaborates: “3 heavily instrumented for flight testing and the remainder as Launch Edition aircraft for early commercial deployment”¹, and CTO comments indicate increasing levels of conformity, which means the aircraft, particularly the first aircraft referenced are not fully conformal any longer)².

Testing Status: MISSED. A further three months have elapsed, and no progress has been made on flight test of even one of the original 6 conforming aircraft. No new targets after the prior MISS on conformal aircraft flight testing.

Q1 2025: A Vague Update

Aircraft Status: NO UPDATE. No information was provided relating to prior aircraft manufacturing targets. The caveat continues: Earnings Call elaborates “a lot of the remaining other areas are available to build conforming hardware and start executing all the tests for credit working towards TIA”³, again confirming progress toward conforming hardware but in turn highlighting current hardware is either partially conforming or non-conforming.

Testing Status: MISSED. A further three months have elapsed, and no progress has been made on flight test of even one of the original 6 conforming aircraft. No new targets after the prior MISS on conformal aircraft flight testing.

Q2 2025: Recent Status

Aircraft Status: Earnings Call indicates Archer “are currently producing six Midnight aircraft, three of which are in final assembly”⁴

Testing Status: MISSED. A further three months have elapsed, and no progress has been made on flight test of even one of the original 6 conforming aircraft. No new targets after the prior MISS on conformal aircraft flight testing.

The Outcome and Current Status: The final number was lower than the original “6+” and the revised “10” from Q4 2024. Most importantly, the aircraft were downgraded to be non-conformal, a much lower benchmark than the original hype of a fleet of conforming aircraft. Despite the “early 2024” (later changed to “mid-2024”) target for flight testing of the conformal prototype, after over 12 months have elapsed there is still no progress on this promise.

Archer’s story has barely changed in the last three years, aside from dropping from ‘6+’ to ‘6’, dropping ‘conforming’ thereby non-conforming, and consistently missing all flight test commencement dates.

So, as one can see from a longitudinal assessment of their own data, Archer has not only reduced the scope of these prototypes but is also very much behind schedule despite supposed industry-leading manufacturing capabilities.

The following two case studies will exemplify why these delays (and many more to come) show that Archers current timelines for Type Certification in 2026 and operation at scale by early 2028 are virtually impossible.

Case Study 1: the Bell 525 Relentless Helicopter

The Bell 525 is a relevant case study because, once certified, it could possibly become the first civilian-certified fly-by-wire (FBW) aircraft. Joby and Archer are both FBW designs for reference – the link between pilot controls and any effector (rotor, tilt actuator, aerodynamic surfaces) is via electrical connections and not traditional mechanical or hydromechanical links. The Bell 525 first flew in July 2015, flown 3,000 flight hours on a fleet of 4 aircraft⁵, and to date it has not yet been given its Type Certificate by the FAA, although this is expected by Bell to occur within the next 12 months, putting it at over 10 years since first flight. Critics will point out that the Bell 525 test program suffered setbacks which caused delay, true, but even discounting several years for this the timelines are not comparable to Archer’s projections.

Figure 1: Both the Bell 525 Relentless (left⁶) and the Archer Aviation Midnight (right⁷) use fly-by-wire technology to link the pilot’s controls to the various effectors (servos, motors, control surface actuators).

Case Study 2: the Augusta Westland AW609 Tiltrotor

The link between the AW609 and aircraft such as Joby and Archer is evident in the complexity added via the tiltrotor design. In fact, we argue there are no closer comparisons for civilian-certified aircraft, or in the latter stages of undergoing such civil certification. As with the prior case study, the vectoring of thrust in this nature, to blend a VTOL platform with an aeroplane, is completely novel when considering civilian-certified designs (the V-22 and all its variants are tiltrotors but are not civil certified). The AW609 first flew in March 2003 and has flown over 1,900 hours⁸ over a fleet of at least 4 aircraft⁹ yet is still awaiting its Type Certificate to begin commercial operations. Critics may again point out setbacks, trailblazing regulatory space for these tiltrotor designs, and larger aircraft, but the point still stands that certification of these novel technologies is not a 1- to 2-year endeavor.

Figure 2: Both the Augusta Westland AW609 (left¹⁰) and the Archer Aviation Midnight (right¹¹) use tilting rotors/propellers to blend the qualities of a vertical take-off and landing like a helicopter with efficient cruise like an aeroplane.

 

We also investigated case studies of the H145, H160, and Bell 429 Type Certification journeys but they are not included here because, although acceptable comparisons due to being VTOL designs certified by a reputable regulator, do not possess any significant novel technologies as these eVTOL designs incorporate. One could conclude, however, it is common for a bare minimum of two years between first flight of the conformal prototype and Type Certification being achieved (which applies for traditional designs, no noted novel technologies, by an established OEM which already has certified other aircraft).

Adrian Norris, Aerospace Advisor with over 30 years’ experience, and co-founder of an aircraft development company has posted some enlightening content on this very topic:

Figure 3: Post by Adrian Norris on why certifying eVTOL aircraft is so difficult¹².

Adrian has further content, which is too detailed to quote here, but is worth reading if you are yet to be convinced that eVTOL Type Certification is not as straight forward as Archer makes it out to be. He rightly quotes that “If technology is an unstoppable force, aircraft certification can feel like an immovable object” and “For investors, this should be a cautionary tale: technical ambition without a clear path to certification is a recipe for delay, disappointment and financial loss”¹³.

 

We now examine Archer’s Midnight in comparison to the case studies and industry expert triggers:

Does Midnight have novel technology? Yes, many: fly-by-wire¹⁴, 6 tilting propellers¹⁵, 6 rigid lifter propellers¹⁶, over-actuated controls¹⁷, distributed electric propulsion, different failure mechanisms and different energy storage systems.

Has a conformal Midnight aircraft flown yet (starting the clock¹⁸ for apples-to-apples comparison to the previous case studies)? No. As Archer has admitted (contradicting its own prior statements¹⁹), the most recent aircraft, Midnight M001 SN001 N703AX, is “a pre-production model, the aircraft will not be flown for credit toward FAA type certification”²⁰. As prior Shareholder Letter trend indicates, this moved from intent to produce conformal prototypes to what is now at best a partially conformal prototype of Midnight M001 SN001. So, we have not even seen the aircraft required to commence credit testing with the FAA. Also, the rate of effort (amount of flying being done) is absurdly low on Archer’s current prototype, N703AX. In the month of July, Archer only completed three flights, as compared to Joby, which also reports to be deep into the Type Certification process but achieved 43 flights during the same period. As these flights are so short in duration, even if this scales up to multiple flights a week or even a daily cadence, this only amounts to around one hour of testing per week and is nowhere near enough flying to make appreciable progress on Type Certification for a 2026 timeline (measured in 1000’s of hours of testing, not 10’s or 100’s).

Has Midnight flown 1,000’s of flight hours? No. As noted previously, the aircraft has exactly zero flight time given that MidZero and Midnight M001 SN001 are non-conformal prototypes. It will take years of hard work to achieve the thousands of flight hours required for FAA or GCAA Type Certification. For comparison, Joby Aviation laims to have flown over 1,000 hours as of 2023²¹ and has probably well surpassed this now given the increase in their fleet size and frequency of flights.

Does Archer have a credible fleet size to support near-term Type Certification? Other OEMs have a fleet size of several aircraft. Archer has no conformal prototype to date. More concerning, longitudinal analysis of shareholder letters shows the ‘conformal’ descriptor was dropped back in 2023. We are unsure how far off Midnight M001 Serial 002 and 003 are from completion, but even if entering service soon, they will not have benefited from any test results of Serial 001 (N703AX), as it has not completed anything other than CTOL flights (unrelated to the primary intent of the entire aircraft design, to VTOL and transition to/from wingborne flight), so will not be a generation ahead. By comparison, as of the day of publication of this report, Joby has a fleet size of 5 aircraft²², not including 3 prior prototypes (Joby could claim 8 aircraft if compared to Archer’s current fleet of Midnight aircraft).

Is Archer ready for Type Inspection Authorization (TIA)? Absolutely not. TIA follows substantial (almost all, but not exclusively) in-house company testing. It is credible that Joby is ready for TIA in the next 6-12 months given they are self-reporting 70% completion of Stage 4 testing. But with Archer’s latest self-report of only 15% (which we also find dubious), the claims of TIA happening in 2025 during the Q2 2025 earnings call are demonstrably false. Archer has not even produced or flown an aircraft with their ‘final’ configuration of propeller blades yet (it is worth highlighting that all manned flights on N703AX are with obsolete aft propeller blades, which Archer has stated will not feature on the next iteration of the prototype design series). This means that all in-house testing to date will need to be repeated (many times), before discussions of TIA have any credibility.

We note that many, though not all of these claims also apply to Joby, however when examining certification progress of Archer and Joby through public quarterly reports, we find the following progress of what we think is, at best, Stage 4 Type Certification progress²³:

Figure 4: FAA Type Certification Progress chart, based on self-reporting information from Joby and Archer shareholder letters (with one notable exception that Archer omitted this data in their most recent Q2 2025 shareholder letter, but it was evident in the earnings call and transcripts²⁴).

It is curious that Archer reported Type Certification progress for three quarters from Q3 2024 to Q1 2025, but has since omitted this from their public reporting. It is evident this progress has flatlined in the most recent quarter, as highlighted by the Q1 2025 earnings call admission that the amount is still at 15%. Archer’s CTO, Tom Muniz, defends this by stating that this number would “move forward in chunks as we work through various systems”²⁵, but we think this is a coverup for the real reason: it is obvious there has been no progress possible, because N703AX is non-conformal, only flying a few flights, only flying CTOL, and hence there is no way Archer has made actual progress on the completion of company flight testing in Stage 4.

We observe that Archer’s certification progress aligns exactly with where Joby reported to be a full two years ago. However, at that stage Joby still had reported flying over 30,000 miles with pre-production prototypes²⁶ which, as noted previously, is beyond the current status of Archer’s Midnight M001 SN001 as a pre-production prototype having only commenced testing, limited to CTOL operations. That would indicate a very conservative two-year lead by Joby over Archer, and based on fleet size and hours/distance flown, probably much larger than a two-year lead. Furthermore, recent progress tends toward 8% completion per quarter for Joby²⁷. This places Joby’s reporting at almost full completion of Stage 4 at the end of Q1 2026, assuming the recent rate can at least be maintained. For Joby, TIA can certainly commence in parallel with the final company in-house tests and as such, all the numbers add up. We will come back to what we think this means for Archer after accounting for differences in reporting format and language.

We noticed the difference in language used by the two eVTOL OEMs, Joby and Archer, with the former showing quite overt charts of progress, and the latter leveraging strategic language in what appears as an effort to obfuscate actual certification progress. Here are three recent examples:

1. “We now have FAA approval for ~13% of the total compliance verification documents in this final phase before type certification”²⁸.
2. “We are largely focused on the fourth and final phase of the certification program and have received FAA approval for ~15% of the compliance verification documents”²⁹.
3. [Sic] “FAA has now accepted about 15% of the final kind of ‘B and B³⁰’ documents that support that certification.” Tom Muniz, Archer’s CTO³¹.

In addition to above examples, see excerpt from archer.com/certification (accessed August 26^th, 2025):

Figure 5: Archer website certification page³² content indicating current progress at “Means of Compliance” and not yet began for credit flight testing – an accidental and honest contradiction to other Archer Shareholder Letter statements. You cannot simultaneously be “Preparing to Begin” ‘For Credit’ Flight Test and deep into the process as claimed.

This sounds to us like Archer is focused on the fourth stage, which may be true. But 15% of the compliance verification documents indicate 15% completion of the third stage, consistent with their own website, or at best Test Plans and Test Procedures for the fourth stage that are yet to be executed.

Certainly, their latest 10-K, stating “We initially submitted a comprehensive proposal for Midnight’s Means of Compliance to the FAA back in December of 2021. We are continuing to work with the FAA to close out our remaining Means of Compliance with the FAA”, and “We are continuing to work with the FAA to agree on the Means of Compliance with the FAA”, indicates that, at least as recently as December 31^st, 2024, Archer had yet to finalize their Means of Compliance³³. This, along with the careful and deliberate use of language in their Shareholder Letters, and website information, provides corroborating evidence that Archer is still in Stage 3 of the certification process. While these steps are not 100% linear (as they can start Stage 4 while Stage 3 is yet to be completed), this would explain why Archer has stalled with very low progress reported against a supposed Stage 4, they are still working on Stage 3 Means of Compliance before they can progress more with Stage 4 (not to mention they are also waiting for an aft propeller blade redesign). In any case, Archer’s self-reported progress on Type Certification is extremely difficult to follow and would benefit from open-book reporting as Joby does in their Shareholder Letters. As an example, here is Joby’s latest Shareholder Letter³⁴, showing a clear snapshot of where the company currently is:

Figure 6: Joby Aviation Type Certification progress, showing a clear snapshot to the exact progress of the company, both from an internal and a regulator perspective. Archer has never reported similar, instead giving a single metric, of which it is unclear what stage they are talking about, or whether it is internal or regulator progress they are reporting.

We believe Archer deliberately hide their Type Certification progress and only report a single vague number as it is not in their interest to detail the actual facts, but rather, hide behind the ambiguity and convenient situation that they are not obligated to provide this information publicly.

Note: We appreciate that reporting differences are difficult between different OEMs and different periods of time. We refer to the Honeywell Advanced Air Mobility Regulatory Readiness Level (RRL) Checklist as an excellent benchmarking tool developed by an independent company with esteemed heritage in the aerospace industry and specifically developed for the AAM market, which Joby and Archer are both participants of. This scale is a 1-to-9-point scale, with 9 being fully ready, and highly analogous to the ubiquitous Technology Readiness Level (TRL) introduced by NASA in the 1970’s.

When examining the AAM RRL, and based on publicly available information, Archer fits the description and check boxes of RRL3 or lower. Archer’s claim of 15% compliance verification documents being accepted could well be Test Plans and Test Procedures on the path to RRL4, but these remain only plans. The difficult work is still ahead with executing these plans and procedures on a future aircraft (Be reminded that Midnight M001 SN001 is “a pre-production model, the aircraft will not be flown for credit toward FAA type certification”³⁵. 15% of the documentation, whilst potentially accurate, is very different from 15% completion of a Stage 4 / RRL4. Hence, the real estimate of Archer’s Stage 4 progress could be closer to 0% than it is 15%, based on the overwhelming majority of the effort being on executing, aggregating, analyzing and reporting test results. As further evidence, note that as of the end of July there is no Midnight that has even completed a full transition with a pilot onboard yet. It is logical that Archer has zero or close to zero flight test data (on a conformal design) as a basis to claim progress from RRL3 to RRL4.

Figure 7: Regulatory Readiness Levels (RRLs) excerpt from Honeywell Advanced Air Mobility Regulatory Readiness Level Checklist³⁶.

Revisiting progress toward type certification, Archer’s claim of 15% completion of Stage 4 appears limited to documentation only. Combined with the observation Archer is at least 2 years behind Joby at present, if not further, and the absence of empirical evidence supporting FAA certification timelines of complex and novel technologies, we think Archer’s ambition to fly a certified aircraft at the LA28 Olympics are laughable. We conclude that Archer’s timelines are entirely unrealistic, and investors do not appreciate the severe dilution that will be in store to bring this product to market, in large part because of Archer’s unclear reporting and misalignment with progress shown versus promised delivery timelines.

It reflects unfathomable levels of arrogance to think that highly experienced companies such as Bell, with the 525 Relentless, and Augusta Westland, with the AW609, take a decade or more from first flight until Type Certification but Archer can do so in under two years (from Midnight M001 SN001’s unannounced successor flying, presumably N704AX), despite the additional complexities and novel technologies inherent to eVTOL.

We notice that there is some notable work from SMG Consulting in a similar vein to the analysis that we present in this report, seeking to understand empirical evidence from the timelines of other aircraft Type Certification journeys. According to SMG Consulting, Midnight will supposedly be ready for the LA28 Olympics, convenient for Archer. However, we see some flaws in the analysis specific to Archer:

• We believe SMG Consulting’s hour estimate for Archer is inaccurate and we challenge Archer to provide actual numbers for MidZero airborne time which we have not seen in any public releases to date³⁷. We think these 500-600 hours could be confused with including hours flown on obsolete prototypes (Maker) and ‘ironbird’ simulator hours but not on the MidZero aircraft alone. If this 500–600-hour count on MidZero was correct, that would have corresponded to over 1,000 test sorties flown, given the aircraft’s low endurance more generally and early focus on hover, where endurance is even lower (mere minutes). Considering MidZero’s first hover in October 2023, subsequent damage downtime, and long periods when Archer used Maker or a simulator instead (still ambiguously claiming flight time as if it could have been Midnight³⁸), the claimed hours are implausible³⁹. For much of this year, MidZero was grounded with non-flyable two-bladed props for media display, not actual flying. Accordingly, SMG Consulting’s assessment of Archer’s maturity is clearly off, making the time to Type Certification sooner than what it will be in reality.
• Certification of Bell 505 as a benchmark does not account for any of the novelty and complexity of the Midnight design. The Bell 505 was a standard helicopter which pales in technical leap compared to any eVTOL. Furthermore, the Bell 505, while a ‘clean sheet design’ was a successor to the very similar Bell 206 and this lineage acts as an accelerator to design, testing and certification. No such lineage to prior Type Certified Midnight aircraft exists. The Bell 505 benchmark at 25 months from first flight to Type Certification provides unrealistic optimism. Perhaps SMG Consulting could have used their alternate presented example in the Robinson R66 at 36 months for something that is still extremely ambitious, but potentially achievable. This choice would have put Type Certification of Midnight well after LA28 Olympics. However, we maintain that the Bell 505 and the Robinson R66 underestimates the complexity in Archer’s design and hence why we raised the examples of the still uncertified Bell 525 and AW609, going on 10 and 22 years since first flight respectively. The Bell 525 and AW609 are more representative of the adversities faced in the pursuit of Type Certification of a novel platform, and indeed, one could argue eVTOL push much further into new ground than even these examples do.
• Certification of the Bell 505 was completed by an experienced OEM with proven pedigree for helicopter design, testing and certification of several aircraft. This was not their first certification program, as is the case with Archer. Bell came to the 505 program with an experienced design team, existing design organization and production organization approvals, and commensurate existing facilities. Archer Aviation is not Bell Helicopters, nor is Archer Aviation an Embraer, or a Robinson or a Cessna as these other examples by SMG Consulting. Archer is a start-up company led by an inexperienced individual who has publicly demonstrated he appears to not fully understand the road to FAA Type Certification⁴⁰.
• SMG Consulting has missed the fact that Archer is 2 years or more behind the current industry leader, Joby, yet on SMG’s timeline this 2-year gap is compressed into a single quarter. Not even Lockheed Martin or SpaceX could close this gap in a quarter, let alone Archer. One might suspect that SMG Consulting has been misled by Archer similarly to what they did with Jimmy Fallon and the Olympics. Archer definitely puts a lot of effort into maintaining this façade. To add to this same point on lagging progress, we are already into the third quarter of 2025 and Midnight M001 SN001 has not flown in VTOL mode yet (more on this later). How is it meant to enter TIA with the FAA in three months’ time when it is 2 years and counting behind in internal company testing first?
• SMG Consulting make an unfounded prediction that Archer will have a conforming Midnight flying (yes, not just built, but flying!) in Q4 of this year. That is a ludicrous prediction given maturity and testing on the current design (Midnight M001 SN001, N703AX has not even completed a single VTOL flight to date).

Aside from those five major corrections, so adding several years for Archer, we do not see a problem with the rest of the chart. We know through open reporting that Joby has completed the majority of in-house testing, sitting at 70% for Joby and 53% for the FAA for Stage 4. It is reasonable to expect commencement of TIA soon. We also observe good progress in Beta, who have recently demonstrated a piloted eVTOL transition, and touring the world with one of their production aircraft. Archer should not reasonably be considered at an approximate equivalent level of progress as these advanced air mobility companies.

Now that we have demonstrated why Archer’s projected timelines should not be relied upon, we also show why it is not the only issue around its core business. Midnight is also a poorly designed aircraft, with many issues and red flags around its design and engineering that put it way behind the competition on many fronts.

Part II: Out-Engineered and Outmaneuvered

Noise Levels

An eVTOL is not quiet just by virtue of being electric. Minimizing acoustic signature takes great effort and often entails a modest performance penalty. It is likely the public does not realize how loud the Archer Midnight aircraft is in comparison to Joby’s design, and this could severely affect social acceptance and adoption.

An introduction to sound and noise: A-weighted decibels (dBA) are a unit of sound measurement that reflect how the human ear perceives loudness at different frequencies. Our ears are not equally sensitive to all sound frequencies. We hear mid-range frequencies (around 1,000–4,000 Hz) better than very low or very high ones. To account for this, the A-weighting filter is applied when measuring sound. This filter reduces the influence of frequencies that we do not hear as well. Effective perceived noise in decibels (EPNdB) or Effective Perceived Noise Level (EPNL) is a measure of the relative noisiness of an individual aircraft pass-by event. It is used for aircraft noise certification and applies to an individual aircraft.

Helicopters, as the benchmark for VTOL flight, typically measure 90-100 dBA in hover at close proximities (such as those experienced in urban environments), or inside the aircraft as a passenger ^41 42.

We begin this section with a short introduction of the work done by Joby on noise before contrasting it to Archer.

In terms of raw performance, the Joby S4 has been purported to be below 65 dBA in the take-off and landing for observers 100 meters away⁴³, which is akin to a normal conversation level or average office environment. When converting the Joby S4 to wingborne flight, the NASA microphones recorded 45.2 dBA on the ground when the aircraft flew at 500 meters altitude at 185 kph, where Joby explained this “will barely be perceptible against the ambient environment of cities”. In June 2022, NASA released a research paper on the acoustic performance of the Joby eVTOL aircraft⁴⁴, lending credibility to Joby’s claims. We also observe Joby has several patents on noise, including multiple passive and active measures for noise reduction. It is important to highlight that Joby shows genuine understanding of the importance of noise in the AAM role, and most importantly, they are fully transparent about the performance of their eVTOL with respect to noise, not just when it is at its quietest (cruise) but also when it is at its loudest (hover, approaches, departures).

Turning to Archer with their Midnight aircraft. Unlike Joby with their open-source quantitative studies and demonstrated noise performance, Archer only appears to have claims. Archer claims the Midnight will produce 45 dBA of noise ^45 46 47. This is purportedly in cruise, and we could find no evidence of design requirements for noise in any other mode of flight. Q commendable cruise noise level, but sadly, it is irrelevant if the noise in the hover is high. This is, in our opinion, obfuscation of information Archer does not want public: their aircraft is too noisy. Archer does not talk about the noise of their aircraft in the hover. They make sure all their videos and media releases are muted whenever Maker or Midnight are in the hover. We have found no evidence from Archer on the noise of their aircraft in the hover, either measured data or undemonstrated design goals for decibel levels. We know they have done the testing for Midnight’s acoustics (‘Conducting a series of hover operations with various microphone arrays to collect supplemental data’⁴⁸). But why is it that Archer is not as open about noise as Joby? The deliberate muting of videos strongly suggests there is something to conceal.

The only real-world evidence we could find about Archer’s noise came from third party measurements from a sound level meter in vicinity of the Maker or Midnight during flight test ⁴⁹. We observe that for most hover operations, Midnight is reading at the 80-90 dBA level. There are times in the video where Midnight and Maker fly overhead at 99–100 dBA, an extremely high level, even deafening. These measurements are presumably with no payload; noise will increase with a 1000lb load of passengers and luggage weighing the aircraft down and making its motors work harder. Notably, while these measurements are unverified, they were also repeated on the Joby S4 and consistent with NASA and Joby’s published sound levels. This, in combination with other evidence (or lack thereof from Archer) gives us confidence that the results of these third-party measurements ought to be taken seriously.

We acknowledge that the noise comparison by an unverified third party using a single sound level meter may reflect biased data. The test was not standardized between measurements, the calibration of the device is unknown, the sample size was small, and the direction and distance of measurement is not controlled for. This highlights the problem; there is no other data, particularly data released by Archer themselves, to provide a more precise answer. We assess this is because the noise profile of Midnight is not something Archer is very proud of; else it would become central to the marketing material used by the company. The simpler explanation is that Archer silences all videos because the noise levels for Midnight are unsatisfactory and would undermine their marketing efforts.

In addition to third-party noise measurements, and the absence of publicly released Archer noise data, there are several theoretical and engineering rationales for why Archer Midnight would be noisier than the Joby S4 and hence corroborate prior findings. These additional rationales are as follows:

• Propeller RPM: Given that tip Mach number is typically constrained to low values to avoid excessive noise and vibration from compressibility effects, Archer, having smaller propellers, will require faster blade RPMs to hover, and thereby contributing to higher noise levels at higher frequencies.
• Blade pass frequency: As above with RPM, the faster the blade rotates, the higher the blade pass frequency must be. This will not only affect the magnitude of noise energy, but also the frequency. The higher frequency blade passes will likely manifest as higher frequency noise which typically have negative perception by human hearing as compared to low frequency or broadband noise. That is, Archer noise will be less pleasant on the ears, comparable to typical GA aircraft such as a Cessna 172 or SR22 Cirrus, multiplied across 12 propellers on the Midnight.
• Blade loading: To reduce noise, a lower blade loading is desired. Blade loading is a function of disc loading and solidity. Archer’s aft ‘lifter’ propellers being 2-bladed had lower solidity than a propeller with a higher blade count, hence a high blade loading and therefore higher noise. This is why more blades are used for the tilter propellers but cannot be done on the ‘lifter’ propellers because this affects cruise drag. Unfortunately, Archer could not make the 2-bladed aft ‘lifter’ propeller design work, so they are reportedly moving towards a 4-bladed design in an X-configuration. This will help reduce noise though not to the extent of a 5-bladed propeller like their front ‘tilter’ propellers or all of Joby’s 5-bladed propellers.
• Blade slap. Blade slap is a loud, sharp ‘slapping’ or ‘thumping’ sound produced when a propeller blade passes through the wake or vortex created by the preceding blade(s) on the same propeller. Blade slap is much more prevalent in edgewise flow so are a characteristic of Archer’s lifter props, particularly in a shallow descent, but much less likely on Joby’s aircraft as Joby S4 uses vector thrust to minimize edgewise flow onto the propellers.
• Blade-wake interactions and blade-vortex interactions. Archer Midnight has six forward propellers all positioned in front of six aft propellers. Joby S4 only has two forward propellers in front of two aft propellers (its wingtip propellers can be seen to have no propellers behind them). It stands to reason that Archer’s design would have higher blade-wake and blade-vortex interactions. This is distinct from prior point on blade slap because blade slap is different blades on the same propeller interacting, whereas blade-wake and blade-vortex interactions are an effect from one propeller onto another due to fore-aft positioning. This point is true even when considering the difference in propeller sizes⁵⁰.
• Many propellers at the same/similar frequency: Archer Midnight employs 12 propellers, double the amount that Joby uses. If not actively managed, these propellers could operate at the same or similar RPM, hence having constructive interference and creating distinct tones (and harmonics thereof). This tonal content is perceived as less pleasant compared to the same noise energy which has been spread out such as with the Joby S4 design using active noise management techniques.
• Mass: Midnight is a heavier aircraft, requiring more lift and consequently producing more noise.
• Prime numbers: Joby uses a prime number of blades. Using a prime number of propeller blades reduces noise (and vibrations) due to maximum mathematical reduction in harmonic resonance. Archer employs this on the forward ‘tilter’ propellers but not the aft ‘lifter’ propellers, a constraint on Archer because of requiring lower cruise drag on the aft propellers and hence requiring 2-bladed (or perhaps now suboptimal 4-bladed) aft propellers.
• Blade spacing: Joby uses unequal blade spacing on their propellers. Archer has not disclosed if using this design feature in the past (MidZero and Midnight M001 SN001 CTOL) but seem to be employing this on only their aft ‘lifter’ propellers in the future (a forced decision because the 2-bladed lifter propellers were not fit for purpose – more on this later).
• Gearboxes: Helicopter gearboxes are known as a primary known noise source⁵¹. It is not known how much an eVTOL gearbox contributes to noise but logically the presence of a gearbox would be noisier than the absence of one. Joby has no gearboxes on their 6 direct drive motors; the motor connects to the propeller at a 1-to-1 ratio. Archer, on the other hand, has 12 gearboxes for their 12 propellers, more than any other helicopter. It is logical that Archer’s design has a reduced potential for quiet operation than Joby’s because of the inclusion of so many gearboxes. Joby discusses this in their Marina Production Launch presentation⁵², indicating that the gearbox noise was one of the factors that “wasn’t good enough for us”⁵³, when they moved from a geared drive to a direct drive design. On the topic of testing gearbox drive systems and moving to a direct drive system, Joby went on to say that “we believe that will have a much greater payoff in the long run to meet our performance requirements and our acoustic requirements with no gears”⁵⁴. This is a clear indication from a company that has done the research, and corroborated by known engineering lessons on helicopters, that gearboxes are far from an acoustic optimum, and a total of 12 gearboxes, all combining at similar frequencies, the design represents a significant acoustic challenge.
• Active noise management: Joby uses active noise management. Joby patents indicate they reduce noise through multiple methods. This includes spreading out the acoustic power of the emitted sound across the acoustic frequency spectrum and controlling the phase of each propeller (in relation to the other propellers), and the RPM of each propeller (in relation to the other propellers), to reduce noise to a far field observer. Archer has not disclosed if they are using this active management strategy for propeller RPM management (though if used in the future, that is another performance hit and potential infringement of Joby’s patents). We will note that even if Archer commenced active noise management at a performance cost, it would be much harder to implement on an aircraft with 12 propellers as opposed to Joby’s 6 propellers. If Archer were to replicate Joby’s active noise reduction strategies, they would have a harder time spacing out 12 different frequencies with sufficient offset from other propellers (in RPM or in phase angle), and it seems unlikely the benefits of such noise reduction would be as impressive for Archer as that demonstrated by Joby back in 2021⁵⁵.

Now these separate pieces of evidence (i.e. third-party noise measurements, suspicious lack of company data, theoretical and engineering reasons), may be defensible individually, but not in aggregate. There is nothing pointing to Archer Midnight being quiet when in the hover (As noted previously, it does not matter that much if quiet in cruise if it is noisy in the hover). On all fronts, we expect the Joby S4 to be the quieter and Archer Midnight to be the noisier of the pair. It is not a controversial set of evidence pointing in different directions, it is not a mix of results, to the contrary, it all indicates the same conclusion: Archer Midnight is, in all likelihood, too noisy.

Investors should be asking more questions on Midnight’s noise profile. It is the decisive characteristic of an effective air taxi that is aiming for high density operations in cities. Given the company’s track record for obfuscation, we would not put it past Archer to provide noise results in forward flight and use carefully crafted language to imply it is quiet everywhere. Until the company can provide compelling evidence that the noise of their aircraft specifically in hover, departure and/or approach profiles is low, we conclude it is yet another cover-up.

Archer says their aircraft is 100 times quieter than a helicopter⁵⁶, and whilst that is a dubious claim in itself, it matters little because that is for cruise. We see that the CFO of United recently viewed the Archer Midnight flying CTOL and commented “I was impressed by how quiet the aircraft was”⁵⁷. This is precisely the trap we are highlighting – cruise noise is of course quiet for an aircraft that can distribute its thrust over many propellers as compared to normal fixed wing aircraft. There is no doubt eVTOLs, including Midnight, will be quiet during cruise. For all other modes of flight, we believe the Archer Midnight is a noisy menace, more than likely 10 dBA or louder than Joby at an equivalent distance, likely with annoying tonal quality relative to Joby, and uncomfortably loud for any cabin occupant until it gets into transition and cruise. It will be helicopter-like for any cabin passengers and hardly the clean and quiet experience being glorified by Archer at expositions. Any engineering efforts to correct this major deficiency would impose delays and cost overruns beyond those already realized by Archer. We believe Archer has more pressing concerns at present; getting Midnight to actually be viable in the VTOL environment (aft blade redesign is required), but some time in future, Archer will need to optimize for noise and with that will come further delays, design compromises and performance penalties; being electric does not guarantee low noise.

Other Design Red Flags

We have seen recent online observations and criticism around design differences between MidZero and Midnight M001 SN001, including the aft ‘lifter’ propellers going from a 4-bladed design to a 2-bladed design. It is evident in their use of the 2-bladed design in all Midnight marketing material, CGI, and even in concerted efforts to remove MidZero’s 4-bladed propellers and fit 2-bladed propellers for public showings that this was how the aircraft was intended to enter the market. Archer installed (show only) 2-bladed propellers for public displays, such as those done with United Airlines and in New York with Jimmy Fallon, both events close to when MidZero was flying with the 4-bladed design. While not improper to change out the propellers for more aesthetic and product-aligned propellers, we consider these lengths, in combination with other actions, most probably to be an act of deliberate misleading of investors, and for what is now apparent in recent news⁵⁸ as part of a broader coverup.

Why is it that MidZero was never shown flying with 2-bladed propellers? Why is it that whenever MidZero was prepared for ground static displays, its aft propellers were always substituted? Why is it the only transition videos Archer has made public kept the aft propellers spinning and any subsequent videos do not show these propellers ever in a static (easily visible) position⁵⁹? Archer should explain all these oddities.

“In an interview this week with The Air Current, Archer chief technology officer Tom Muniz confirmed that the company now plans to certify Midnight with four-bladed lifting propellers, rather than the original two-bladed propellers that are currently installed” – The Air Current “Each of those aircraft will feature our production 4-blade rear propeller” – Archer Q2 2025 Earnings Call Transcript Reinterpreted: Forced design change of major component required by Archer to make their Midnight eVTOL certifiable. Online speculation and recent short report were on the money.

It is now apparent. Archer’s CTO, Tom Muniz, has stated the company is moving toward 4-bladed aft propellers in an X-configuration and for the first time, this has become evident in shareholder correspondence as mentioned in the latest earnings call⁶⁰. A wise move to change it, but we wonder why it took so long. And during all this time of touting images of 2-bladed Midnight in PR stunts and CGI, or 4-bladed Midnight in their supposed ‘transition’, we question why Archer is indicating that their design is mature and that Type Certification and entry-into-service are imminent. Also, it was apparent that Archer had been working on this design change in the background. We wonder which goal there is by continuing to promote commercial operations starting in 2026 when manned flight test has only just begun, in CTOL flight only, and VTOL flight with new propellers was still very far off. Those unfamiliar with eVTOL performance qualities may see a demonstration of 55 miles and 31 minutes for a CTOL only flight as impressive progress⁶¹. However, what they may not realize is that because CTOL uses much lower power than VTOL, these achievements will not transfer one-to-one when Archer finally commence VTOL test profiles. VTOL will use more battery energy in the take-off, departure, approach and landing segments and this will have a negative impact on both range and endurance.

On might view the recent 55-mile CTOL flight⁶² by Archer as impressive. Bu their competitor, the Joby S4, completed a flight of 154.6 miles, for 1 hour and 17 minutes, which included VTOL, not with CTOL to save energy⁶³. That is 248% of Archer’s time, and 281% of Archers distance, all whilst still including that more difficult VTOL segment. The critical point: Joby did this over 4 years ago on July 27^th, 2021⁶⁴.

Even if Archer increase their numbers in the future, there is a very long way to go to be at the level Joby is at. It is deeply concerning that Archer’s CEO is hyping TIA in 2025⁶⁵ (which means in the next four months), whilst simultaneously promoting their very basic achievements showing they are in the very earliest stages of envelope expansion and only in CTOL. These two things are highly incompatible.

We present a theory on why and how this unfolded, backed by experts’ opinion and cross examination of other eVTOL designs. We looked at the following designs which are directly comparable to Archer, being a ‘lift-and-cruise’ design. By contrast, industry leader Joby is not comparable as it is a vectored thrust design, but Vertical Aerospace VX-4, Beta Alia-250 VTOL, and Wisk Aero Gen 6 are all lift-and-cruise designs as is Archer Midnight. Our assessment of each design is presented below:

Vertical Aerospace VX-4

The VX-4 lifter propellers have an ingenious design: they have 4-bladed propellers to allow for sufficient lift (and appropriate balance with front propellers) and low noise yet scissor into the same frontal profile as a 2-bladed propeller to reduce drag when in cruise. This is an optimal compromise. It is likely that the 4-bladed propeller design in hover allows sufficient sharing of the lift across these 4 blades to not require hinges as seen in the following design. These hinges are more likely to be required for 2-bladed designs as the per-blade forces are necessarily higher. The ingenious design of the VX-4 lifter propellers comes at a penalty of some few more moving parts and therefore complexity and new failure modes, but at least the design makes sense and there are no red flag issues with the way the propellers function at subsystem level or how they affect system level performance.

Figure 8: Vertical Aerospace VX-4 showing aft propellers unfolded for VTOL (top)⁶⁶ and ‘scissored’ and parked into a low drag position for cruise flight (bottom)⁶⁷.

Beta Alia-250 VTOL

The Beta Alia-250 VTOL is a very interesting comparison to the Archer Midnight. The Alia VTOL variant uses 2-bladed lifter propellers (both forward and aft of the center of gravity, not just aft like Archer). Whilst we could find no explicit evidence in writing, image analysis indicates the Alia-250 VTOL has hinges as shown in the following graphic.

Figure 9: Close up of Beta Alia-250 VTOL (Source linked) showing evidence of hinged design on the left, with equivalent close up of Archer Midnight M001 SN001 aft ‘lifter’ propeller showing apparent rigid attachment right⁶⁸.

The reason for such hinges is obvious to any aerospace engineers with helicopter experience as their presence implies functionality just like a helicopter tail rotor (same propeller properties in being exposed to strong edgewise air flow, but just in a different plane of rotation). The forces on these eVTOL propellers, and a helicopter tail rotor are strong and cause bending moments on the blades of the propeller. When rigidly attached, these bending moments can manifest as substantial vibrations and noise, and lead to blade failure or other objectionable resonance issues. Simply putting a hinge in the mechanism alleviates most of these bending moments incurred through edgewise air flow, yet still allows the propeller to function as required, to provide vertical thrust for eVTOL or yaw counter moments for helicopter tail rotors. This is consistent with our cross examination of the Midnight design in being a 2-bladed lifter propeller, yet seemingly lacking hinges to alleviate moments incurred from edgewise flight.

Wisk Aero Gen 6

Wisk, similar 12-tilt-6 general arrangement as Archer, uses 4-bladed props on the aft of the wing⁶⁹ so (with reference to Archer’s 2-bladed design promoted on N703AX) Wisk does not have the same vibration characteristics and are able to achieve greater hover performance (albeit at possible detriment to cruise performance due to higher drag). Wisk Gen 6 is effectively the design Archer is forced to move toward such that this one subtle difference between the two is now no longer the case. Ironically, Archer is still copying the moves of Wisk, with Wisk also adding more propeller blades to their Gen 6 since the design Archer were accused of shamelessly copying in circa-2021^{70 71 72} . We are not implying further patent infringement by Archer. We appreciate 4-bladed propellers are commonplace in aviation, rather, the drollery in Archer still converging on the next generation of the Wisk Aero design, and being shamefully unoriginal.

Figure 10: Archer eVTOL design (right) uncanny resemblance of Wisk eVTOL design (left) in circa-2021, with both sporting 2-bladed aft ‘lifter’ propellers (Source linked).

Figure 11: Since 2021, both Wisk (left⁷³) and Archer (right⁷⁴) have moved to 4-bladed aft ‘lifter’ propellers on this identical ’12-tilt-6’ eVTOL general arrangement.

 

The point is clear: every other eVTOL OEM either used 2-bladed propellers with hinges (Beta Alia-250), or 4-bladed propellers with design mitigations or concessions (scissoring blades for the Vertical Aerospace VX-4, or accepting increased cruise drag for the Wisk Aero Gen 6). There are no eVTOL companies with advanced designs, at full scale and at such high mass like the Archer Midnight which rely on rigid 2-bladed propellers in edgewise flight, a lesson well known to helicopter tail rotor engineers, long recognized as problematic. Archer overlooked this on 2-bladed designs and has paid the price with redesign work and delays. Archer has indicated that their next aircraft “will feature our production 4-blade rear propeller”⁷⁵, but has not explained why their design required changes, how this affects prior test results and the need for regression testing, and how inconsistent this is with marketing a mature (stated as “not merely a developmental prototype”⁷⁶) design.

Archer has been testing a new version of their aft ‘lifter’ propeller in-house (and by testing, we mean ground testing, not flight testing on Midnight itself). But that is completely inconsistent with Archer’s public announcements and actions. Based on available evidence, their actual progress appears as follows:

1. Failed to achieve transition on Maker without the need for 3-bladed aft ‘lifter’ props.
2. Design goal of 2-bladed aft ‘lifter’ props for Midnight in all CGI renderings.
3. Failed to achieve transition on MidZero without the need for 4-bladed aft ‘lifter’ props. Explained this away as just ‘akin to not retracting the landing gear on a conventional aircraft’⁷⁷.
4. Commenced work on alternate aft propellers and settled on a 4-bladed X-configuration.
5. Maintained a 2-bladed aft propeller on Midnight M001 SN001, but only in CTOL, not VTOL. Again, a cover up by implying CTOL is a goal they are pursuing for safety, and not the reality of a forced decision due to the design failing of the 2-bladed aft propellers.
6. Becomes public that Midnight will need new aft propellers⁷⁸.
7. First evidence in shareholder reporting that future Midnight will be fitted with new aft propellers⁷⁹.

To predict Archer’s possible defense to this, they might say that they are improving the design, optimizing, showing ingenuity, etc. But this is incredibly incongruous with their other messaging, and so we ask: Which is it?
A) A mature design, conformal or partially conformal, imminent Type Certification and entry into service, or
B) R&D, still figuring out the design and things may change at this stage?

It is evident that these narratives are incompatible, and Archer has not been held accountable with shifting between narratives as the situation suits without being forced to address this flip-flopping.

This is problematic because if Archer was in the early development phases of their product and overt about finding optimal design solutions, and perhaps signaling entry-into-service in 2030-2035, it would not be concerning at all. But that is not the case. Archer is quite the opposite, with a façade of lies about the maturity of the Midnight design, Midnight M001 SN001 being a conformal prototype (which we know is untrue) and Type Certification and entry-into-service being imminent. In reality, the design is not frozen. Archer is still doing R&D on major assemblies such as the aft ‘lifter’ propellers, the product does not yet resemble the Special Class Airworthiness Criteria⁸⁰ and has not actually even tested the design they intend to bring to market on the aircraft in flight testing yet, let alone generate the volumes of test data required to support company satisfaction and FAA satisfaction underpinning a Type Certificate. More concerning, the story keeps changing and there is never an admission from Archer of sprucing an immature design as if it was mature.

Archer framed N703AX, their current testing aircraft, as conducting CTOL because of the utility this brings, yet in reality, it was most likely a coverup for Archer to buy some time; to progress the small part of the flight envelope they could make progress while trying to resolve the deeply flawed aft propeller. This represents a major red flag.

In this post⁸¹, Adam Goldstein doubles down on this ‘VTOL & CTOL’ aspect of the design. It is a smart play; show the obsolete N302AX doing VTOL where you cannot see its aft ‘lifter’ propellers are 4-bladed, against all other media and design material, and accompany it with N703AX doing CTOL, which is not yet capable of VTOL. And voilà, you have the appearance of progress. This overlooks the fact that N302AX has never been shown to CTOL, and that N703AX has never been shown to VTOL. This fragmented approach seems to meet requirements, but it is ultimately illusory.

Adding multiple different demos together to create the impression the design can accomplish all capabilities simultaneously is both misleading and disingenuous. Some readers may recall our⁸² previous report on Archer, where we showed that they used similar shenanigans with the test flights videos – digitally altering clips and used them over and over to portray a myriad of test flights that did not happen. This allows Archer to exaggerate results from a limited amount of testing, and we suggest this is exactly what they are doing with the small amount of testing on VTOL (N302AX) and CTOL (N703AX) by trying to combine these into one picture, even though that has never been demonstrated on a single prototype.

Until a Midnight design can do all those things, without changing critical elements of the design such as propeller blade swap outs, it is just a fairytale. Maybe N704AX (purported successor to N703AX), or N703AX with these supposed redesigns aft propellers will be capable of the full scope of the normal flight envelope, and that would be good news for Archer, but it is incredibly late in the development and cannot sustain the company’s certification timelines.

If you doubt the aft propeller issue, see this post from the lead engineer for blade design on Bell V-280 Valor tiltrotor, an industry expert of unparalleled applicability to the topic at hand:

LinkedIn post by Christopher Foskey, Staff Engineer – Advanced Concepts at Bell Flight, who has worked as the Blade Design lead for the V-280 Valor JMR-TD and listed as an inventor on 50 patents⁸³

So, what does a late notice surprise of such magnitude do for the Archer design? The following are areas it affects:

• Added weight to an already heavy aircraft. Adding weight in that specific area will need to be accounted for in the structure of the pylons and wings.
• Change to flight loads.
• Change to vibration profiles.
• Increased vulnerability to bird strikes. It is common for deliberately slender and lightweight props to be more robust to damage when centrifugally stabilized (i.e. Wisk Aero Gen 6). The X-configuration propeller design will have a wider frontal profile in cruise ​(wider than Vertical Aerospace VX-4, and 6 lifter props versus just 4 on the VX-4), which considerably increases the probability of a strike. Those outside of the aviation industry may not realize that bird strikes are actually a very common occurrence for VTOL platforms, and design and testing for bird strikes is important.
• Requirement to redo all previous testing. Previous testing is an indication only and all performance data, stability, control and aircraft handling, reliability, and acoustic data are all invalid, requiring to be redone from first principles.

And ultimately, what does all this mean? To begin with, Archer can hardly be trusted. Archer must regard their investors as gullible to believe they can test a non-conformal prototype with unworkable propellers, modify the design, run a full test campaign on it from VTOL through transition, and ship it to the UAE for further testing in the next 6 months. Even the likes of Lockheed Martin or SpaceX could not pull this feat off. We may see some cool footage of N703AX or N704AX with new propellers this year, sure, but the overly ambitious commercial projections for UAE operations in 2025, TIA in 2025⁸⁴ and FAA Type Certification in 2026 Archer spins are just concepts. They will still be testing non-conformal Midnight prototypes whilst all these dates come and go.

As a matter of definition, if Archer is still conducting developmental testing on the aft propellers (and not only that, but also how they integrate with the rest of the aircraft and its performance and handling qualities), then they are not doing certification testing for the FAA. This point may be overlooked by industry outsiders, but it should be made unequivocally clear, Archer is nowhere near certification, and it does not even seem they know whether the new design will solve the problems or require further design iterations, as they have not flight tested the design. Without this confidence, any timelines promulgated by Archer are without basis. How do we or they know with any certainty that the design issues are solved in the absence of substantial flight test data? How can they promise certification or entry into service when they have not even proved the design works? This reflects a high degree of management negligence and recklessness.

Midnight Lacks Any Competitive Advantage

In this section, we benchmark the known facts about the Archer Midnight design against the Joby S4 design. Unsurprisingly, Midnight is far behind. We analyze the (lack of) competitive advantage of Midnight in five main sections:

• Powertrain (motors, inverters, gearboxes)
• Batteries, range, and endurance
• Aircraft mass
• Acoustic performance
• Relative production and operating costs

Powertrain (Motors, Inverters, Gearboxes)

We understand that comparing a 6-tilt-6 design with no ‘lifter’ propellers in the Joby S4 versus the 12-tilt-6 design of the Archer Midnight is not a strictly direct comparison. We rely on metrics such as specific torque and specific power to establish a fair basis for comparison. Namely, it does not matter that Archer chose more motors that are smaller while Joby chose less motors that are larger, dividing by mass create an equal playing field. This is often called ‘normalizing’ or ‘specific power’, or ‘power-to-weight ratio’ etc, and is a common method in engineering to compare relative performance instead of absolute performance.

The following table compares some key powertrain characteristics. In this comparison, the powertrain is given to be a unit containing the motor (including housing and multiple motor windings), dual inverters, integrated cooling, bearings and gearbox if applicable:

Note: Green cells indicate a superior design characteristic, amber cells indicate a slightly inferior design characteristic, and red cells indicate an appreciably inferior design characteristic.

In summary, Joby has developed a world leading powertrain and that is evident in their mass being a whopping 44% lighter than Archer’s design, whilst still outputting 68% more torque. This is important because it affects the bottom line for Archer and Joby. The fact that Archer’s motors are so inferior could possibly be the reason why their design has far less range and is oversized in isolation but is even worse when considering other aspects of underperformance (consider in relation to batteries too).

On a last related note, in Archer’s “Open House” presentation⁹⁹, the presenter and slide show quote that Archer’s direct drive motor design would have been 100lbs heavier (for the aircraft, so approximately 8.3lbs heavier per motor unit given they have 12 units). This makes the Joby design even more of a marvel; if we were to have an Archer direct drive to compare instead of their gearbox design, the difference in motor performance would be even more pronounced by Archer’s own data. It is very notable that Joby has stated that they compared geared motors to direct drive and having a geared motor “wasn’t good enough for us”¹⁰⁰, while Archer did the exact same comparison, but claims run in the exact opposite direction. It is unlikely that the different general arrangements of Joby S4 versus Archer Midnight would reverse the equation. So, given such a conflict in feedback from eVTOL engineers, who is to believe, Joby as the company who had a geared system on a prior prototype, has tested it, and has moved in the direction of a direct drive motor, or Archer, constrained to use available motors (“in the realm of typical automotive motors”¹⁰¹)? To us, Archer’s argument is not credible and is more than likely a diversion from another forced decision in the compromise of a design philosophy of using available components. That may be appropriate to expedite the path to market (although they are still very much behind), but the severe performance penalties borne from such a philosophy may kill their product completely when it moves into a competitive market and/or fails to improve on existing VTOL technology (helicopters).

Batteries, Range, Endurance and Speed

We start by comparing Archer Midnight and Joby S4. Batteries tend to be a large proportion of an overall eVTOL aircrafts mass (approximately 23% of Archer’s maximum take-off mass and 27% of Joby’s maximum take-off mass). So, subtle differences in the energy density can be amplified at the aircraft level. Below is the battery performance from open-source data:

As shown in the table above, Joby has better batteries on all metrics: the total mass of batteries is lighter in an absolute sense, but they are also lighter in a relative sense (battery energy density at the pack level). And despite there being less battery mass on board, the total energy contained is higher for Joby. As for the motors, Archer’s design is heavier and there is a positive feedback loop that eVTOL manufacturers need to avoid as best as possible (heavier batteries means heavier aircraft, heavier aircraft means more power required, more power required means more batteries required¹⁰⁷, more batteries required means heavier batteries, and so on).

The next point we want to address is how those batteries affect the aircraft level performance. Archer claims their Midnight design has a range of up to 100 miles at speeds up to 150 mph¹⁰⁸. Joby has demonstrated their S4 range by completing a mission of more than 150 miles and claims to be capable of transporting passengers at up to 200mph¹⁰⁹. We acknowledge that these ‘up to’ speed claims are likely well above typical cruise speeds, but remain relevant claims of themselves (for missions where speed is more important than conservation of energy), and a strong indicator for the relative cruise speeds of these two aircraft.

One explanation of why such a massive divide comes down to design choices made early in the process. In VTOL taxonomy, the Joby S4 is a purebred vectored thrust design, whereas the Archer Midnight is a vectored thrust for the forward motors, but uses a lift and cruise strategy for the aft motors. Once through transition and into wingborne flight, the Archer Midnight has 6 aft motors that are a substantial drag penalty, and act to reduce the speed, range and endurance of the aircraft. Joby on the other hand reaps greater efficiency by tilting all propellers, and we think this fundamental choice could be a primary contributor to the performance discrepancy of Joby and Archer.

We begin by examining how these metrics affect the pair of eVTOL aircraft in the intended market of ‘electric air taxi’. We used downtown Manhattan as an origin location for air taxis and assessed the serviceable area of Joby S4 and Archer Midnight. In the image below, Archer Midnight’s range at 100 miles is shown in red, and the Joby S4 at 150 miles is shown in blue.

Note that as these companies are aviation companies, we assumed they both meant nautical miles, not statute miles, and speeds were in nautical miles per hour (knots), not statute miles per hour. This is declared for academic honesty and accuracy of these estimates and could well be in error, but if wrong, it would not alter the point of the argument or conclusions drawn.

Figure 12: Whilst 50 miles range difference does not seem like much, it translates into a lot greater capability for the Joby Aviation S4 over the Archer Aviation Midnight.

Archer can fly passengers to anywhere in a 7,854 nm² area, whereas Joby can access a much larger 17,671 nm² area with their increased range. Whilst the 1D range increase for Joby over Archer is a modest +50%, this results in a staggeringly large additional 2D area able to be serviced at 225% as large” (meaning 125% more). The number of added connections creates far more utility for Joby over Archer. Put another way, if there is a chain of taxi trips required to service a given network of nodes, it will take a much larger fleet of Archer Midnights to interconnect and service those nodes. Joby aircraft will likely have greater seat usage rates in having greater flexibility to service a greater number of possible nodes. And this added range will not take substantially more time from Joby to access either, on account of their faster cruise speed. The Joby S4 at 200 mph is 33% faster than the Archer Midnight at 150 mph such that (analyzing the cruise segment of the mission only) Archer can complete their 100-mile maximum range in 40 minutes, while Joby can complete their 150-mile range in a comparable 45 minutes. There is practically negligible penalty for the added range that Joby has managed to engineer into their aircraft.

To offer the same serviced area, an equivalent Midnight fleet would need to be larger, and that will cost more to acquire and maintain. It would only make sense for a fleet operator to use Midnight if the unit acquisition cost and maintenance cost was far lower than what Joby can operate at, else risk being drastically outcompeted by the superior competitor.

An alternative way to view this situation is that Joby has (or had, now that they have progressed well into certification) flexibility in their design to reduce the battery mass and thereby the energy storage down to 100 miles range, equivalent to Archer’s aircraft. This would have allowed the Joby design to have greater payload for the same range. Either way you look at it, Joby has options. Joby wins.

Aircraft Mass

As opposed to the previous section on powertrain, requiring greater explanation of why Archer’s tech is so much worse than Joby’s, this next part is really simple: Archer’s aircraft is heavy. And weight kills performance.

It is not clear exactly what the precise mass of Midnight is. Midnight is a series of designs, not yet one frozen design baseline. We think that the first Midnight design, MidZero (N302AX) was approximately 6,500lbs because this has been released by Archer:

Figure 13: Archer’s description on their “Midnight Completes Transition Flight” YouTube video¹¹⁰ and reiterated on their website¹¹¹. This was posted on June 12^th, 2024. It reads as proud of being large (although referring to mass not size) as this is critical to viability, but this is false as proven by Joby who have achieved far lower mass.

Admittedly, that statement could be about the series of Midnight designs or what Archer thinks it will be at a later date, but we think they are referring to the specific N302AX tail because it was posted before Midnight M001 variants were produced, and because it was posted specifically on the video of N302AX transitioning.

This means that Midnight is not only heavy, it is overweight relative to its own 7,000 lbs¹¹² design goal, because put simply, a 6,500 lbs aircraft with the intended 1,000 lbs of payload will see Archer’s aircraft at 7,500 lbs, an excess of 500 lbs over the target.

A 500lb weight cut is a significant challenge. They will remove some instrumentation between the prototype models to the production models, but this flight test instrumentation is generally not significant in mass and will be replaced by other configuration items required by the production models (i.e. cabin seating).

Compare this to Joby at a nimble empty weight of 4,300 lbs and with the 1,000 lbs of payload brings it up to a maximum take-off weight of 5,300 lbs¹¹³. That is a massive difference of 1,700 lbs to Midnights goal (7,000 lbs), or 2,200 lbs to where it seems Midnight is currently headed (7,500 lbs maximum take-off weight). This difference has some profound effects on the interaction, economics and operation of these eVTOL aircraft:

• Downwash: The downwash created by the propellers when the aircraft is in hover can be a problem, particularly given the intended use of these aircraft is in the urban air mobility ’air taxi’ role. The downwash of these aircraft has been studied by regulators such as the FAA¹¹⁴ and CAA¹¹⁵. Given the vastly higher mass of Archer Midnight over Joby S4, it would be expected that Archer Midnight will have higher downwash and associated problems.
• Cost: Cost generally scales with aircraft mass. A heavier aircraft generally has more components, in this case more carbon fiber, likely heavier landing gear, a heavier powertrain with more materials used in its construction, larger cooling systems, and more battery mass. This is different to criticizing Archer’s choice of 12-tilt-6 versus Joby’s 6-tilt-6. It is not about those design choices but simply a comparison of scale. Now this argument of scale is simplistic and there will be some more discussion on the nuance later, but for now it would be expected, all else being equal, that Archer’s design would cost more because it is much larger.
• Noise: Similarly with cost, a larger aircraft would be expected to generate greater noise than a smaller aircraft, all else being equal.

None of these above qualitative factors on mass state that Archer’s design is inferior to Joby’s per se. Just that the design point of 7,000 lbs (which might now be 7,500 lbs) creates a headwind for Archer that is greatly diminished with Joby at their much lower aircraft mass. In combination with the rest of this report, we have found no evidence that Archer has any potential to overcome that headwind, and to the contrary, we see evidence of stacking adversities.

As with Midnight’s excessive mass, it is also physically larger. It is unclear what Midnight’s precise wingspan is; different sources vary from 48 ft to 50 ft. In contrast, Joby’s wingspan appears to be 39 ft, meaning an approximate 10 ft difference in this maximum dimension. This may seem minor, but it is yet another factor that must be accounted for with vertiports and aircraft hangar design for storage and maintenance of these aircraft. Archer will have slightly less access to confined area approaches (areas with adjacent obstacles such as buildings, fences, poles, trees, etc).

In the latest earnings call¹¹⁶, Archer’s CTO Tom Muniz states that “an aircraft of at least 6,000 pounds will be critical to being able to carry economically viable passenger payloads”. This appears to be a direct shot at Joby, as the industry leader, whose aircraft has a maximum gross weight of 5,300 lbs. Tom Muniz is demonstrably wrong, and Joby has proved this, not only by the 1,000s of flight hours, 10s of thousands of miles flown, manned transition flights in multiple countries, but also the advanced standing with Stage 4 Type Certification progress. Archer has failed to keep aircraft mass below 6,000lbs and this example is one of many instances where Archer downplays Joby’s accomplishments in order to falsely elevate its own standing. Midnight is heavy and no amount of normalizing that through malintent speech about competitor weights will address the performance penalties to Archer’s aircraft. Joby has a substantial advantage in mass that we expect to carry through to their bottom line and ultimately outcompetes Archer.

Acoustic Performance

Without reiterating prior evidence, we believe Archer Midnight to be significantly inferior to Joby in acoustic performance, both in magnitude of noise, but also in frequency content (quality of noise). This should be considered in addition to all the other points in this chapter that will hurt Archer’s ability to commercialize their product in future. If it underperforms in powertrain and batteries, has inferior range, endurance and speed, is oversized and heavy, offers inferior value for money, AND is too noisy, that is far worse than just being too noisy on its own.

Relative Production and Operating Costs

Production and operating costs can only be analyzed qualitatively and relatively. Even Joby and Archer would have vague figures on this at the current point in time given they are still scaling up production and operating costs are not yet established. However, there is still valuable comparison between Joby S4 and Archer Midnight as an early indicator of costs. We compared Joby S4 and Archer Midnight general arrangement of components to see which would be expected to be more expensive in relative terms of raw component costs and production costs (i.e. specialist tooling, assembly line demand, labor, quality control, and acceptance testing). The table below shows that comparison, with green being expected lower cost, amber being expected slightly higher cost, and red being expected appreciably higher cost:

Based on available data across all major components of these eVTOLs, Joby S4 is expected to be cheaper than Archer Midnight. When comparing general arrangements and overall scale, there is not a single metric where Archer comes out on top. For Archer to get their unit cost down they would be leaning heavily on their design philosophy of using existing components as opposed to Joby’s design philosophy of vertical integration to the maximum extent possible. We do not think it is credible, and do not see any evidence that Archer’s philosophy is the better. Vertical integration can work incredibly well. Archer on the other hand, must pay the middleman’s profit margins for any supplied components which only serves to increase unit costs for Midnight. The greater the number of units produced, the greater the advantage to Joby’s vertical integrations strategy should be. Just as with performance, Joby holds the clear advantage on production cost.

The same consensus applies to operating costs as it did to production costs: Joby has less to maintain with their direct drive motors as opposed to Archer’s motors with integrated gearboxes, Joby has half the motors, inverters, radiators and batteries in their design to require maintenance actions. All else being equal, we would expect the operating costs associated with maintenance to be lower for the Joby S4 as compared to the Archer Midnight.

It will be some time before the conclusion on production and operating costs of these eVTOL aircraft can be quantitatively compared with rigor. For now, quantitative analysis must do, and a conclusion therein is quite clear. Archer Midnight is likely to be far more expensive than its competitor, Joby S4. Joby has disclosed expected production costs of approximately $1.3 million per aircraft while Archer has signed offers to sell Midnight at approximately $5 million per aircraft, it already leaves a lot more room for Joby S4 to be cheaper.

This is likely to translate into greater market share for Joby, or potentially even a monopoly in the U.S. market given time. Particularly when combined with other advantages the Joby S4 has over the Archer Midnight. Joby could change their business model and start selling their aircraft as direct competition with Archer, but even if they did not and maintain an OEM and operator model, there is little rationale for an air carrier to choose Midnight. They would risk being outcompeted by Joby’s aircraft in being cheaper to produce, yet more capable, and probably accompanied with higher levels of social acceptance due lower noise profiles. And as we showed in our previous section, a lot of Archer’s current counterparts are not remotely credible.

Conclusion on (Lack Of) Competitive Advantage by Midnight

Midnight, if it even reaches production, will ultimately fall short on performance metrics, and when benchmarked against its domestic competitor Joby S4, it will be too expensive and too noisy to realistically compete. And even if a niche buyer were willing to pay a premium for novelty, they will be stuck with an overly noisy aircraft, completely unsuited to the AAM role, and underperforms its peers across all important performance metrics such as range, endurance and speed. On the contrary, there is yet to be evidence of any technical aspect where Archer Midnight is a superior aircraft.

A Domino Effect on Production

In this chapter, we demonstrate the consequences of one not being ready to produce and having a flawed eVTOL design, but still trying to appear as such. Given Archer’s recent emphasis on its manufacturing capacity, what we found is truly shocking.

Part III: The Empty Factory

As a highlight of their latest earnings call¹²⁸, Archer chose their “Manufacturing Ramp of Midnight Aircraft”. Supposedly, 6 Midnight aircraft are currently in production, with 3 of them being in final assembly at their facilities in California and Georgia. The company even posted some pictures on their social media accounts, showing a few employees working on a couple of aircraft.

As we’ve known for a few years that Archer’s only strength is marketing, we decided to investigate these claims and see for ourselves if this “manufacturing ramp” is substantive. What we uncovered and are presenting in this section indicate this ‘highlight’ is yet another PR exercise from Archer, which is seeking to maintain appearances against Joby’s real progress.

Over the past couple of years, Archer has been touting the creation of this new manufacturing facility in Covington, Georgia. Supposedly, this factory will be able to produce up to 650 aircraft per year, with the help of Stellantis, which promised around $370 million worth of employee support as well as $20 million in incremental manufacturing capital expenditure. In exchange, the company got millions of free warrants and Archer will match the labor cost provided with shares priced at 90% of the Archer’s volume-weighted average stock price during the quarter.

Currently, the company expects to be able to produce up to 50 aircraft per year in that facility. Although only a fraction of the final goal, we believe it is overly ambitious given the company’s current technological maturity.

Moreover, at the moment, the manufacturing facility has supposedly been up and running for a while, as stated by management a few months ago and in the company’s filings:

“Multiple additional aircraft are being built at [Archer’s] facilities in San Jose, California, and Covington, Georgia. A company spokesperson said those aircraft will be ‘partially conforming’ and can be flown for certification credit, expected to commence in the back half of the year.”

“In December 2024, we completed construction of our high-volume aircraft manufacturing facility, ARC, located in Covington, Georgia. We started production of aircraft at this facility in the first quarter of 2025 and plan to focus on building aircraft across our facilities in Georgia and Silicon Valley for use in testing and certification, as well as to support plans for early commercial deployment.”

When we visited the facility on weekdays during the months of June, July and August 2025,we barely observed any activity besides a couple of people walking outside the facility and a few cars parked, giving the impression of a facility standing idle, awaiting a genuine purpose

Note: View of the main parking lot (August 2025)

 

Note: View of the main parking lot (June 2025)

 

Note: View of the main parking lot (June 2025)

As is evident from the pictures above, the facility is not all hands-on-deck manufacturing the promised fleet of aircraft. We also notice a few dozen cars. Can an eVTOL manufacturing facility of this size properly run with such a low number of employees? We do not think so. Moreover, Stellantis is supposedly providing Archer with additional workforce support, yet there was no visible evidence of such personnel presence.

Note: View of the docking ports and small car park (August 2025).

 

Note: View of the docking ports and small car park (June 2025).

 

Note: View of the docking ports and trash container (June 2025).

Other pictures corroborate our observations, the docking ports are unused, and the large exterior container is filled with only a few cardboard boxes. No evidence of the necessary raw materials was observed.

Note: View of the aircraft hangar (August 2025)

 

Note: View of the aircraft hangar (June 2025)

 

Note: Side and back view of the facility (August 2025)

 

Note: Side view of the facility (June 2025)

We also see that the aircraft hangar appears unused, providing no confidence in the readiness of the supposed fleet or its progress. Again, the facility should already have been operational long before now. The evidence suggests no meaningful activity is occurring and we are confident that once again Archer is deceiving investors with their operations, only focusing on issuing fluff PRs and creating the illusion of progress to reassure investors.

A final note for this section, these findings coincide perfectly with the fact that Archer delivered an old aircraft for their “Launch Edition”. In Q4 2024, management was already talking about manufacturing up to 10 aircraft in 2025, with 7 of them being used for the “Launch Edition” program. It appears they actually could not do it on time, and investors would have been disappointed, so delivering an outdated, useless aircraft was a far easier option for them to sustain their misleading narrative.

Exposing the Marketing Façade as a Cover-Up

Finally, in this last chapter, we expose another one of Archer’s major marketing stunts, the so-called ‘$6 billion order book’. Over the past few years, the company has issued multiple explosive press releases highlighting huge orders, sometimes from companies virtually unknown to the public. We demonstrate that a significant portion lacks credibility, most being simply tiny startups and even for some, having already cancelled their order.

Part IV: The $6 Billion Mirage

Archer is boasting a large order book of over $6 billion comprised mostly of MoUs (Memorandum of Understanding) and non-binding or low commitment ‘orders’ from various customers. However, by looking deeper into each one, we found that some of the orders are already seemingly off the table while some counterparts do not even have the resources to honor the announced purchase contract.

We believe that in some instances, Archer simply negotiated and signed some of these contracts in order to be able to issue yet another promotional press release, without any real substance or opportunity behind it. We present our findings in this section below:

Future Flight Global

On August 13^th, 2024, Archer announced that it received a planned purchase order of up to 116 Midnight Aircrafts worth up to $580 million from a company called Future Flight Global (FFG). In reality, the order is firm for 44 aircraft, with an option to buy an additional 72.

The company was created two months prior to this announcement, has no official address disclosed, an anonymous investor (said to be from the automotive sector), a team of 5 to 10 employees (3 listed on LinkedIn and all part of the team listed on their website) and has no operations besides this announcement and a few other partnerships. One of their main partnerships is with a related-party Titan Aviation, where the founding members of FFG were part of the leadership team.

Moreover, the founding team and management seem to be people with no exceptional business achievements or profile. For example, one of the co-founders Karan Singh is simply a former commercial pilot from India’s Jet Airways. A textbook fluff announcement when the stock was trading at a very low price of around $3.5.

Also, the company has supposedly signed orders with other eVTOLs companies recently, such as with Eve Air Mobility for up to 54 eVTOLs in June 2025, to operate them in Brazil and the U.S. With no clear direction for its operations and so far, no tangible operations, this counterparty seems to be a simple PR firm.

Kakao Mobility

Earlier that same year, in May 2024, Archer announced that it had been selected by KakaoMobility as their eVTOL partner and that Kakao would fund their Korean commercialization efforts. Moreover, Archer stated that they would conduct a public flight demonstration in Korea’s Grand Challenge in Q4 2024. However, we discovered that Archer’s incompetence led to them being incapable of performing the demonstration, but also led to KakaoMobility giving up on their plans with Archer entirely. On the other hand, Joby performed the demonstration without any trouble.

According to this news outlet from Korea, on December 14, 2024, around 300 people attended the event in Goheung, Korea. The schedule shows that only 20 minutes were planned for “Flight Demonstration” where only Joby has been flying.

(Translated from Korean)

We found many articles mentioning Joby’s flight demonstration, however, Archer does not appear anywhere in the news, because they were not even there.

In another article, the news outlet states that Archer’s & KakaoMobility consortium actually failed to “secure an aircraft”. It also seems like the consortium actually gave up on commercializing UAM (offering rides with Archer’s Midnight) and will only offer UAM services through its platform (with other UAMs).

(“The ‘UAM Future Team’, which included Kakao Mobility, LG Uplus, and GS Engineering & Construction, which previously completed Phase 1 of the demonstration, also completed only the integrated operability demonstration excluding the aircraft. This is because the UAM Future Team also failed to secure the aircraft.”

Kakao Mobility, which led the consortium, also lost momentum as its method of participating in the demonstration project changed. Kakao Mobility is currently a participating business in the UAM Future Team Vertiport sector. A Kakao Mobility official said, “The roles have changed after discussions among the consortium members,” and “Kakao Mobility will focus on serving as a platform for UAM commercialization based on our platform technology operation know-how.”)

Korean Urban Air Traffic (K-UAM), Jeonnam Goheung Demonstration Flight, Joby S4, Seoul Metropolitan Area UAM Route Map, Route, Companies Participating in the UAM Project Beneficiary Owner: Naver Blog ( KakaoMobility’s consortium participated without Archer).

In other words, similar to what happened in Japan, which Culper Research’s report presented, Archer simply failed to provide their partners with a functioning aircraft, or should we say just an aircraft at all, which led to them cancelling their plans with the company. Unsurprisingly, Archer failed to disclose this to investors, and kept the planned purchase from KakaoMobility of up to 50 aircraft (worth up to $250 million) in their order book.

Note that in July 2025, during the Expo 2025 Osaka, Archer and their partner Soracle showcased a “full-scale model” of Midnight. Funnily enough, not only did the aircraft not fly, but it also was the N302AX, the old non-conforming model, which conveniently happened to be in the UAE a few days prior.

Air Chateau

On November 16^th, 2023, Archer announced “Air Chateau International’s planned purchase of up to 100 Midnight aircraft worth up to $500 million” through the signing of an MoU with “an initial non-refundable, pre-delivery payment of $1M by December 31, 2023”.

We believe this announcement to be just another fluff press release to bump up Archer’s order backlog. As we dug deeper into this counterpart, we found that it has been and still is a small helicopter fleet operator that offers VIP services in one UAE airport, very far from being able to operate and in need of 100 Midnight aircraft. Moreover, this company recently pre-ordered 10 eVTOLs from a competitor called ‘Crisalion’, with deliveries potentially sooner than Archer’s, if they ever happen.

Air Chateau’s operations depend on the Mohammed Bin Rashed Aerospace Hub initiative, around $4.63B according to their website, which is funding the “next-generation UAE Aerospace”, a huge project which does not let a lot of extra budget left for a huge fleet of eVTOLs. A $500m investment for a small aspect of the project does not seem realistic at all. Similarly, Air Chateau stated that Acorn Capital Ltd would be their financing partner, but such a huge order represents more than 20% of the partner’s total assets under management.

Would the $4.63 billion aviation initiative fund a $500 million purchase of 100 eVTOLs? Given the huge masterplan shown below, it is highly doubtful. As shown below, it does not seem like there is planning to expand the existing heliport that much, only doubling the capacity from 8 to 16.

Source: Facebook / Master Plan | Mohammed bin Rashid Aerospace Hub | MBRAH (mbraerospacehub.ae)

According to Air Chateau and its founder’s social media posts, Air Chateau only acquired its first helicopter in September 2023, an Airbus ACH-125 worth around $4 million, which was delivered to the company in November 2023. This happened two years after the inauguration of the heliports and only two months prior to the announcement of the $500 million Midnight purchase, again being completely unimaginable. Moreover, we cannot see any picture or post showing more than two helicopters at a time. As of today, the company appears to only have a tiny fleet with a couple of helicopters.

Source: Instagram

Source: Company’s website

The company’s operating capacity is minimal compared to the announced purchase agreement of “up to 100 aircrafts”. According to Archer’s press release itself, their new “state-of-the-art hangar can accommodate “up to 10 helicopters, including 5 medium and 5 light helicopters for regular hangarage or 6 helicopters undergoing heavy maintenance”, as they only operate an 8-pad heliport.

The “non-refundable deposits” of $1 million and “$4 million after signing” announced by Archer would amount to the price of one eVTOL, which is what we believe to be the final purchase agreement. The rest is only to pump the stock.

It appears that the first plan of Air Chateau was to allow helicopter owners to operate their helicopters there, probably along with a few operated by Air Chateau themselves.

“Creating an all-round ecosystem to ensure safe, reliable, and efficient helicopter operations should meet the current demand on the part of the transport system, passengers, and helicopter owners to improve accessibility and passenger mobility in Dubai and the UAE.”

Source: ArcosJet and Air Chateau Pair on Dubai Heliport Plan | Aviation International News (ainonline.com)

As of the day of this report, it appears that the company is now defunct. Both Air Chateau’s official website and its reservation platform are inaccessible. Air Chateau and its CEO’s Instagram accounts, usually showing high activity, have not seen any publication related to the business since October 2024. Moreover, according to this article, Air Chateau Dubai Helipark was supposed to host an event showcasing eVTOLs. This event never happened. Finally, we cannot find any trace of the company’s activity after October 2024. In our view, it is clear that the company has ceased operations. Nevertheless, Archer has not disclosed this development to investors despite the significance of the order involved.

U.S. Air Force

On July 31^st, 2023, Archer proudly announced that it had entered into contracts worth up to $142 million ($110 million and $32 million) with the U.S. Air Force, “the largest eVTOL commitment yet”. In August 2024, under the previously announced contracts, the company said it had delivered the first aircraft to the Air Force. We can find Archer stating the fact that they’re working with the Air Force in almost all of their marketing materials. But these announcements hide a totally different reality.

As of the day of publication of this report, Archer’s website shows a total contract value of up to “$148 million”, mirroring that the contract is growing in value and moving forward:

The first red flag we notice is how the company and management are saying “contract”, as if it was a singular “up to $148 million” awarded to them. In reality, it is at least 2 contracts, one of $110 million and the SBIR program award which currently sits at a total of $33.1 million. This makes a huge difference as it is effectively not the largest contract awarded or “commitment” to an eVTOL company.

There are other red flags surrounding the communication on these DoD Contracts. For example, when looking into the SBIR website (SBIR is the program under which the contracts have been awarded), and other federal spending websites the only verifiable awarded total amount is about $33.1 million.

Source: Firm | SBIR

Source: Award | SBIR

This does not mean that Archer received $33.1 million from these contracts so far. It is only the amount that the Air Force is currently supposed to spend on the current contract. According to other databases, Archer currently did not receive more than $744,796 from this contract since 2022.

The other contract is “an $110,000,000 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for Midnight Based Advanced Vertical Lift” SBIR Phase III (which currently does not appear in the SBIR database). However, in the USASpending.gov database, we can see that so far, this contract has an awarded amount of only $1.3 million.

Source: CONTRACT to ARCHER AVIATION INC. | USAspending

In other words, while Archer has been touting their relationship with the Air Force and a contract worth up to $148 million, the only verifiable amount that has been awarded is a total of approximately $34 million, with only $1.3 million out of a potential $110 million awarded from their biggest contract. Once again, the company is disappointing its commercial counterparts.

Part V: The Abu Dhabi “Launch” and “Delivery”

For years, Archer has been touting a launch in the UAE. We believe that when Joby launched in the UAE and commenced doing complex flight testing there (routine manned flights, hover, transition and cruise flight, full mission profiles), it has put pressure on Archer to pretend to keep pace with competitors and has driven them to prematurely deploy an aircraft to Abu Dhabi.

Archer deployed MidZero, the obsolete, unmanned aircraft, to the UAE for what they call a ‘kick off to their UAE Launch Edition program’. Recent shareholder letter¹²⁹ and earnings call¹³⁰ make multiple mentions that: “we delivered our first Midnight aircraft to the UAE”, “Delivering our first Midnight aircraft and began flight testing with the GCAA”, and “delivered midnight to Abu Dhabi”.

We examined this claim and found it to be egregiously deceptive.

Launching & Delivering the Obsolete Version? Incredible

It is strange to “test” N302AX given the extensive design changes already revealed. This aircraft is not conformal, is not for credit testing, and does not even represent the next iteration, Midnight M001 SN001. At this early R&D stage, meaningful engineering insights are unlikely; the real focus should be on getting SN001 or later variants through transition. Even without more context, this looks more like another PR move, especially compared to Joby, which is doing credible manned transition testing in new and challenging (hot, humid, dusty) environments. That kind of advanced testing makes sense for a program with over 1,000 flight hours and 40,000+ miles. But because Archer’s newer aircraft cannot yet hover, management had little choice if they wanted to meet their UAE summer launch promise. This decision is the first red flag surrounding their recent ‘launch’.

We begin to see the problems with Archer’s fleet. N302AX can do VTOL, but only with 4-bladed aft propellers (not part of the future configuration). N302AX can only support unmanned operation. N302AX can operate in Abu Dhabi, but not outside of the hover unless Archer changes their location and approvals. And even then, it seems they have severe vibration problems through transition on this design. N703AX supposedly can only do CTOL until it receives the new propeller blades¹³¹, and it has not had substantial time under test. In contrast, Joby has combined all of this in a single flight, barring CTOL as it is not so important for an eVTOL aircraft despite Archer’s suggestion of such. This difference is monumental to anyone familiar with the matter. This inability for any one Midnight prototype to be capable of much really undermines the concept of a ‘launch’. We wonder what they are aiming to do on this launch with their unmanned platform. It seems that it just entails showing the customer it can hover for a short amount of time, an extremely pathetic display in contrast to what Midnight is being sold to do.

Sadly, it’s easy to see why Archer would do this (other than the obvious PR goal), they are forced to because they do not have a fleet. They simply do not have aircraft to deliver, they only have 2 dissimilar prototypes, each non-conformal, and each not ready for actual delivery. This broadcasting of deliveries and ‘Launch Edition’ program kick-off is reckless and shameful commercial conduct. It is deliberately manipulative, deceitful and acting in bad faith.

Product Launch: Expectation vs Reality

This was used as somewhat of a demonstration of their ‘Launch Edition’; a program aiming ‘to establish a pragmatic and repeatable commercialization’¹³². ‘Launch Edition’ was never sold as a demonstration where the aircraft could be transported to another country and hovered on the spot. It was a commercial oriented term used to assist early customers with integrating a technology that is in its nascent form, with immature training, maintenance, logistics, and operations.

Archer’s CEO, Adam Goldstein, posted on social media “This flight officially kicks off our UAE Launch Edition program and is an important next step in our commercial deployment plans in the UAE”¹³³. The same was posted on Archer’s social media^134 135. In another forum at the Milken Institute, Adam Goldstein said¹³⁶: “We will launch – the goal is to launch this year first internationally, we will launch in Abu Dhabi, but the goal is to quickly launch here in the US after that”. It is thereby confirmed: the non-conformal first draft of MidZero / N302AX is Archer’s answer to a 2025 ‘Launch’.

We observe that the aircraft that hovered in the UAE was N302AX, the same aircraft that was apparently ‘delivered’ to the U.S. Department of Defense. Naturally, we know the aircraft was never truly delivered (in the normal definition of the word). Furthermore, in the aviation industry, ‘delivery’ would usually infer the transfer of title, or at a minimum, operational custody of an aircraft to a customer, but Archer is still the registered owner of the N302AX aircraft. The play on words ‘delivered’ is yet another red flag. The same aircraft that was ‘delivered’ to the US DoD as part of the AFWERX Agility Prime program is also now part of what Archer announced, “officially kicks off our UAE Launch Edition program” and “delivered midnight to Abu Dhabi”¹³⁷. Investors should be asking how one aircraft can be delivered twice but still owned and operated by Archer¹³⁸. The US DoD wanted to have an aircraft to test and did not get that, and these ‘Launch Edition’ customers are meant to be receiving the first serial numbers of a mature product and being assisted to operate/train/maintain these aircraft by Archer. Apparently actually delivering product is not in Archer’s repertoire, and perhaps next N302AX will be on the ‘Launch Edition’ for its other customers. In reality these customers are lucky not to receive N302AX – all evidence points to it being an overweight, vibey, noisy, non-conformal, unmanned drone, and not befitting of a product claiming to be close to a certifiable and inhabited aircraft. It is certainly not a product or even close to a product.

Figure 14: Archer’s prior Midnight version (unmanned, obsolete landing gear, obsolete aft propellers and other design changes), sent to a populated part of Abu Dhabi to hover in front of the Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque for PR. Image from Archer’s website¹³⁹.

Resource Prioritization

Another red flag is that Archer’s management would attempt such a move at this stage. They are fully aware their engineering and flight test team is limited in size. Those personnel would be far better utilized by addressing the pressing technical challenges; getting ready for Midnight M001 SN001 (N703AX) CTOL and, eventually, VTOL testing, preparing test plans and procedures for progression with the FAA, various tests that are possible with simulators and iron birds and a myriad of other tasks. We strongly argue that deployment to Abu Dhabi hinders progress toward certification. Such an action, to prioritize this demonstration, clearly shows that when pushed PR and maintaining the façade of keeping up with the industry leader is more important than progressing engineering and testing.

Scope of the Test Demonstration Flight

When following the footage released by Archer themselves¹⁴⁰, the flight is as basic as it gets. The aircraft takes off facing North-Northwest, comes to a high hover, maintains the hover for the photo op, then descends without any noticeable change in heading. If Archer had more impressive footage, they would have shown it. But apparently, this was the most impressive they had. They crossed the sea for an on-the-spot hover with a beautiful backdrop and that was the full extent of this logistics planning, the regulatory approvals required and the myriad of guests invited to witness the event. That single hover test will not get Archer meaningful data on the conditions in the UAE. They need thousands of test points to establish that.

Launch Location: a Key Indicator for Underlying Intent

Lastly, we examine the location, which may seem minor but is actually the most telling detail. The reason Archer gets to hover in front of the Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque is precisely because it was just a hover. Joby’s backdrop in vicinity of Dubai is not as flashy, in a desert environment, but that is by design. Joby is doing full flight envelope testing, including VTOL, transition, cruise flight and representative air taxi mission profiles. Joby needs more room to maneuver, and it is typical to do this type of testing away from a populated area as an industry standard, and regulator mandate, for safety.

This is different for a hover, which, due to the low altitudes and almost zero translational speed, allowing it to be done in a small, clear space within a city. We think Archer will need to move their operation for any real flight testing to take place and sadly for them the PR will not be anywhere near as impressive.

This situation reveals something important. That this location would be a complete waste of staff time to generate the approvals necessary for this testing, because we know it was a dead end; it cannot support flight testing much beyond a simple hover. It is revealing to the inner workings within Archer’s management. It shows that there is no future for this particular test or stunt, it wasn’t for the engineers who need data there, rather it was done to keep up the appearance of progress at all costs.

Figure 15: Stunning photo of the aircraft in an out-of-ground-effect (OGE) hover, but this is not real flight test, this is an obvious stunt, centred around generating precisely this type of image. Image from Archer’s website¹⁴¹.

Archer completed this stunt in front of the Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque, viewed from the Al Bateen Executive Airport¹⁴² toward the Northwest, with camera facing approximately Southeast. Here is a view of the local area where Archer operated:

Figure 16: Google Earth imagery of the Rowdhat region of Abu Dhabi, showing the Al Bateen Executive Airport and the Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque. Notice the high density of buildings in this region.

From the location Archer was approved to fly their aircraft, the airfield boundary was only approximately 200m away on the Southeast, with public roads at approximately 240m away from the aircraft. That is completely suitable for a hover and reasonably safe (we see no third parties in the area during the flight footage). However, reexamine the image of the surrounding area of Rowdhat Abu Dhabi. It is densely populated. This area around where the Al Bateen Executive Airport exists is amongst the most densely populated regions in the Emirates of Abu Dhabi. For anything outside of a hover, it is hard to imagine a worse site to set up a flight test. Worse yet, the airport is not exactly quiet, at 10-15 movements per day¹⁴³ to coordinate a possible flight test operation. It would be a nightmare for a flight test team to have to manage for any ongoing operation week-after-week, month-after-month. No rational regulator would allow flights in this region for a medium- or long-term test campaign including transition, cruise, circuit operations or basically anything outside of a hover as it combines the following features:

• Midnight is a large aircraft (available information indicates Archer’s prototype aircraft are approximately 6,500lbs empty weight¹⁴⁴). If Midnight were to crash into a building it is unlikely the building will protect the occupants from injury or fatality.
• Midnight, specifically MidZero (N302AX), is a remotely piloted aircraft and would likely need to be operating Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) if Archer were to apply for more complex operations, not just a hover, which is a higher risk operating mode than Visual Line of Sight (VLOS) operations.
• All variants of Midnight are uncertified and unproven aircraft, meaning high risk operations to a regulator assessing these applications. There is little Archer can do to reduce this risk because they need to do more flight testing to establish trust in their prototype. They are not yet at the stage of Joby who have enough data to substantiate such a demonstration (i.e. flight in New York City¹⁴⁵).
• The airfield in question is over an extremely populated area. This has implications for human life, but also for expensive third-party property and insurance implications.
• To conduct transitions, cruise flights, circuit operations, and other maneuvers, the aircraft will need to be operated at moderate speeds (which seems to be operated at approximately 100 mph in Archer’s footage¹⁴⁶) and at a reasonable altitude. These parameters increase the kinetic and potential energy respectively, and hence the risk that the regulator will be assessing.

In conclusion to this, from a cursory look at the airfield, it was clear this stunt was inherently limited in scope and offered no real value to their flight test or engineering team. It was just a hover for the photo op and the location was likely selected for the sole purposes of its aesthetic, a very shallow view of actual flight test for what they claim is ‘kicking off their Launch Edition program’¹⁴⁷ and ‘delivering Midnight to the UAE’. It was done in an attempt to show keeping pace with Joby even though this was completely different. This stunt, endorsed at the highest levels of management, reflects poorly on Archer’s credibility, this is the eVTOL equivalent of Nikola Corporation rolling a truck downhill.

To corroborate our previous statements, we analyze Joby’s flight test operation in the UAE, in vicinity of Dubai to contrast the difference. The following images show Joby’s approved landing pad and indicative flight geography for comparison.

Figure 17: In contrast to Archer’s choice of test location, above image shows the Joby S4 N544JX landing at their chosen test location. Image shows an austere test site, with no surrounding buildings or people – a typical and responsible test location for testing of an experimental vehicle. Image from Joby chase aircraft LinkedIn¹⁴⁸.

Figure 18: Typical flight geography for Joby’s UAE flight testing. Image shows bare desert with some small towns in the horizon but are miles away not under the flight path – a typical and responsible test location for testing of an experimental vehicle. Image from Joby’s YouTube channel¹⁴⁹.

Joby’s operation shown here is clearly established for ongoing routine operations at the forefront of the setup and for PR as a secondary concern. The location is not glamourous but practical. The flight path allows for the full spectrum of aircraft operations. Clearance distances to third parties are maximized. Risk of third-party interventions (air or ground) is relatively low. Exposure to environmental factors (heat, humidity and especially dust) is maximized to get the most out of testing in this environment.

None of those aspects that Joby has implemented with their test setup are present with Archer’s setup and it is truly revealing. Joby have demonstrated high tempo flights in the UAE. As far as public information indicates, Archer has demonstrated just one flight. Joby has demonstrated manned flights in the UAE. Archer has not. Joby has demonstrated transition and cruise in the UAE. Archer has not. Joby’s data has credibility to answer the questions at hand about heat, humidity and dust. Archers does not¹⁵⁰. Joby is in the final stages of testing; they are confident with the major assemblies and seem to be testing things like the suitability of the air conditioning system¹⁵¹. Archer is still changing major assemblies like their propellers and landing gear and may not even yet have an air conditioning system to start testing.

Conclusion on Abu Dhabi ‘Launch’ and ‘Delivery’

Archer’s recycling of obsolete aircraft, false “deliveries,” shallow resource allocation, and minimal hover tests all point to one thing: a PR stunt devoid of engineering or commercialization value. In stark contrast, Joby’s program represents a full-scope, long-term campaign with genuine technical progress. By branding this hollow display as “kicking off the UAE Launch Edition program” and “delivering an aircraft,” Adam Goldstein and Archer cross into outright deceit, on par with Nikola’s infamous shenanigans.

We hypothesize that in the next 12 months following entry into the UAE, Joby will achieve dozens of sorties, manned, VTOL, transitioning flights, in hot conditions, in a ramp-up to a commercial launch in that country, in operational test of their aircraft in its intended configuration and environment. But, in the same 12-month window, we hypothesize that Archer will do little more flying in the UAE, perhaps another few flights, but meaningful for commencement of a real operation in the country, and certainly not transitioning flight in front of the Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque.

Future Direction of the eVTOL Market Participants

Part VI: Overplayed Defense Opportunities and Underestimated Competition is a Dead End for Archer

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has evaluated eVTOL technologies in recent years, however initial enthusiasm has been tempered by operational realities. A comprehensive analysis by the RAND Corporation for the U.S. Air Force (USAF) concluded that while eVTOLs could benefit select missions, they “are unlikely to be transformational today“^152 153. The report identified a need for aircraft capable of carrying a 1,000 lb payload for 150 to 200 nautical miles, a benchmark current battery-electric models struggle to meet. The Air Force’s AFWERX Agility Prime program, acknowledging that battery-only eVTOLs lack the range for critical military applications, has shifted its focus toward hybrid-electric propulsion systems^154 155. This assessment has provided an impetus for eVTOL companies like Archer and Joby, amongst others, to pivot towards a hybrid solution out of necessity.

Overplaying Defense Opportunities

Archer announced a strategic partnership with Anduril on December 12^th, 2024, to create a hybrid eVTOL that will “target a potential program of record from the United States Department of Defense”¹⁵⁶. Since then, Archer’s CEO has indicated that defense, rather than air taxis, could become its “front and center“¹⁵⁷ business, a pivot that raises questions about its original air taxi focus. We wonder what Archer’s civil airline partners in United Airlines, Jetex, Ethiopian Airlines and Southwest Airlines will think about this statement and being apparently deprioritized to the latest bandwagon. Perhaps it is that, with the realization that the aircraft is too noisy and therefore compromised in its primary role as an air taxi, or has uncompetitive specs versus the competition, Archer is looking for another avenue to diversify risks.

Around the same time as Archer’s pivot, RAND Corporation reports on eVTOLs were released, and the Researchers went on record to state that “no major command appears ready to sponsor an eVTOL capability today” and “recommended that Agility Prime scale back the program to a ‘few of the most capable eVTOL aircraft ‘ and smaller demonstrations. It should continue working with commercial partners, they said, but crucially, those relationships should not be tied to funding”¹⁵⁸. We conclude that even with a cursory look at the Defense opportunity, formal research is strongly indicating that Defense are not in a rush to get any Archer product, and the DoD is leaving it to the industry to fund this development without putting in any substantial money from this point forward. Archer has overplayed the Defense opportunity and, given their limited team, is actively diversifying into another sector at a cost to their original pursuits. Earlier sections of this report detail how behind schedule Archer are on certification and manufacturing prototypes. They could certainly do with more resourcing on their primary pursuits.

Archer’s Defense-Centric Progress to Date

Archer’s engagement with the DoD is centered on contracts notionally valued at up to $148 million. However, their achievements lack the substance of Joby’s:

• ‘Delivery-in-Place’: In August 2024, Archer announced the ‘delivery’ of its Midnight aircraft to the USAF. This was a ‘delivery-in-place’, meaning the aircraft never left Archer’s own flight test facility in Salinas, California, and custody was never transferred to the DoD. To date, Archer has not delivered a single aircraft to a U.S. military base.
• Simulator-Based Training: Archer’s contract deliverables have focused on a mobile flight simulator. Unlike Joby, it has not trained USAF pilots on its actual aircraft, a critical step for genuine operational integration.

Archer’s tangible engagement with the U.S. DoD appears superficial. Headline contract values mask a reality of minimal funding and a lack of substantive operational integration. Achievements touted by the company, such as aircraft ‘deliveries’, are revealed to be administrative transactions rather than the physical deployment of hardware to military facilities for genuine testing and evaluation.

Strategic Confusion

Archer’s primary defense strategy is a partnership with defense technology firm Anduril Industries to develop a purpose-built hybrid aircraft. This venture represents Archer’s first attempt at hybrid-electric propulsion, a field where it has not previously demonstrated hybridization.

Archer seemingly generated and released imagery of their Midnight aircraft, converted into what appears to be an uninhabited version (no cockpit glass shown), but maintains the same shape as their original aircraft, including distinct fuselage lines, wing, and one can make out the most inboard pylons, and upward tilted propeller nacelles. Below shows original imagery:

Figure 19: Archer product marketed as a hybrid eVTOL for defense applications¹⁵⁹.

Below is an excerpt from defense.archer.com (accessed August 26^th, 2025) shows the aircraft was clearly intended to be “Midnight-Like”:

Figure 20: Evidence that, at least initially, Archer intended their defense pivot to leverage existing work on Midnight.

It would seem that the original intent was to take the Midnight aircraft, including existing fuselage section, wing section, flight controls and propulsion system etc, and retrofit it with a hybrid powertrain (perhaps also reducing the battery mass a little to compensate for the added turbogenerator). This would leverage the work done to date. In the Earnings Call from Q1 2025¹⁶⁰, Archer’s CEO said: “So what we are looking to build is a vehicle that can have both dual use, civil and defense application that reuses as much as possible from the existing program we have today with a hybrid powertrain” and “we can flex between the civil side and the defense side and give upside to the ability to deliver more aircraft if we’re able to build and there are programs that are in place”. In the Earnings Call from Q4 2024¹⁶¹ on the topic of defense, Archer’s CTO said: “This program will build directly on Midnight’s core technology”. Therefore, from both the images and the statements from the Archer executives we conclude that the concept was to pursue highest commonality and a retrofit for a hybrid powertrain, rather than a completely new design.

It only took three months for the narrative to shift.

“What I can share is that we are focused on building a revolutionary aircraft, not simply a hybridized version of an eVTOL” – Archer’s CTO, Q2 2025 Earnings Call Transcript “You cannot simply hybridize a passenger eVTOL. You have to build a new bespoke aircraft” – Archer’s CEO, Q2 2025 Earnings Call Transcript “You cannot simply slap a heavy fuel powertrain onto an existing eVTOL design” –Archer’s CEO, Q2 2025 Earnings Call Transcript Reinterpreted: Archer internally realizes they cannot properly reconfigure Midnight as a hybrid eVTOL and/or cannot afford to lose one of their few R&D prototypes to hybridization modifications, have experienced setbacks in the Anduril development, so are using the same old playbook of publicly putting down the competition’s strategy or creating distraction to cover up their uncomfortable truth.

This admission suggests the Midnight platform is unsuitable for hybridization, forcing it to start from scratch on a ‘revolutionary aircraft’ as the CTO put it, with no firm timeline for flight testing, signaling probable schedule delays. In this arrangement, Anduril serves as the lead systems integrator, with Archer acting as the “platform provider”, a dynamic that positions Archer more as a subcontractor supplying an airframe than an equal partner driving innovation.

This alternation between a retrofitted hybrid powertrain on a “Midnight-Like” aircraft and shadowy image of Midnight, to what seems is deliberately laying the groundwork for a larger change, seemingly a start-over for a clean sheet design, is quite confusing and highly suspicious. Particularly with the timing of the Joby partnership with L3Harris Technologies. We think these statements by Archer’s executives during the latest earnings are an early warning.

One such theory of why this groundwork is required (building on prior evidence), is that Midnight is too heavy and is struggling to be hybridized like Joby have already proven. This theory goes that with Midnight being so heavy at “~ 6,500 lbs” and turbogenerators having lower specific power than batteries¹⁶², the substitution of some batteries for a turbogenerator may have resulted in a platform with insufficient range, payload and/or endurance to be useful to Anduril and Archer have no other options to increase those characteristics without increasing weight, then being unable to hover properly.

Another theory, non-exclusive the last, is that the Archer’s recent acquisition of the Overair patent portfolio has something to do with it¹⁶³. Such an acquisition of another competitor’s mature core intellectual property is not the actions of a company which is accelerating their own mature platform. The acquisition also indicates that, before the acquisition, Archer lacked the in-house expertise to design the ‘revolutionary aircraft’. This acquisition suggests an intent to use that technology, either in combination, or in substitution, of Archers original concepts. If Archer are using the Overair core technology, that would be a fundamental pivot away from the Midnight conceptual design and constitute a start-over in design, prototyping and production preparations. It would not result in a “Midnight-Like” aircraft as previously proposed. The Overair design features much lower disc loading than the Midnight design and so would presumably be better able to be hybridized if the issue was that Midnight was overweight¹⁶⁴. This theory certainly fits with the Archer executive laying the groundwork for big changes in the last earnings call.

Whether these specific theories are confirmed or not, we question whether there are ulterior motives to these earnings statements like with various other examples of Archer habitually denigrating the competition and attempts of misdirection.

Is Midnight Core Design Attritable?

To add more confusion on the Archer Defense strategy, Archer CEO also talks about “attritable assets”¹⁶⁵. Attritable assets are, as the name suggests, able to be lost in combat. They are designed to be cheaper and hence reduce the loss to the DoD when destroyed. We should point out how ridiculous this concept is if trying to leverage Midnight, a product apparently vying for FAA civil certification. On one hand, Archer is trying to make an aircraft that has multiple layers of redundancy, has passed the extremely high bar of FAA certification, should experience less than one catastrophic failure per 100 million flight hours, and is selling to civil customers for $5M per unit¹⁶⁶, with support contracts required at up to $15M¹⁶⁷, for a total of up to $20M per aircraft. This cost is in the same ballpark as medium-sized helicopters and exceeds most light helicopters that Midnight would be competing with in a militarized VTOL role. Yet an attritable “Midnight-Like” aircraft are meant to be accepted as routine losses. These are diametrically opposed design philosophies and operational strategies. Would it not be more logical to design an attritable asset that has:

• Reduced redundancy – cheaper and still congruent with an ‘attritable’ philosophy.
• Avoid capital outlay on the non-recurring engineering which underpins certification with the FAA – attritable assets do not need to be based on a platform that has, or will undergo, a full certification program.
• Use materials and off-the-shelf components that are cheaper – perhaps trading off against a shorter operational life, hence being synergistic with being ‘attritable’.
• Place a greater emphasis on low-cost manufacturing techniques – again perhaps with trade-offs but ones which are acceptable given a different aircraft role.

This is all to say that the design philosophy of the Midnight as a prospective FAA certified air taxi are not well aligned with the ‘attritable asset’ philosophy. But that does not stop management using the buzz words of the current defense landscape to hype their product and exploit current Pentagon procurement trends, regardless of technical reality.

Archer has a smaller fleet than Joby, and so, dedicating an aircraft to be converted to a hybrid (like Joby has done with hydrogen in the past) has a larger impact on Archer than Joby. Archer must take a prototype aircraft away from the Midnight air taxi R&D test program and convert it to a defense hybrid. Given these aircraft are the most important commodity to Archer at present, that choice ought to be raising eyebrows from the likes of their civil airline partners: United Airlines, Jetex, Ethiopian Airlines and Southwest Airlines. The opportunity cost of such hybridization is a slowdown of progress towards Type Certification. Archer weaves a story like their Defense concepts are a great idea and provide early revenue but in reality, their team, and their fleet is too small to pull this off. The original design commonality appears to be shaky, and the concept of being attritable is mistaken.

Underestimating the Competition

Joby’s relationship with the DoD, which began in 2016, is a model of consistent, dependable execution. The company has built a foundation of trust by consistently meeting or exceeding its milestones, positioning it as the military’s most mature and integrated eVTOL partner. Joby announced its partnership with L3Harris Technologies on August 1^st, 2025, which, in a similar strategy to Archer, uses the civil eVTOL as a baseline as shown in the following image¹⁶⁸.

Figure 21: Released image of hybridized Joby Aviation S4.

Joby’s partnership is anchored by contracts with a total potential value of $163 million¹⁶⁹. Unlike notional contract ceilings, Joby’s engagement has translated into concrete deliverables:

• On-Base Aircraft Deliveries: Joby has physically delivered two of its production prototype aircraft to Edwards Air Force Base, with the first arriving six months ahead of schedule. These are not paper deliveries like Archer; these S4 aircraft are stationed on-base and are being used for hands-on testing and operational experimentation¹⁷⁰.
• Operational Expansion: The company is scheduled to deliver two more aircraft to MacDill Air Force Base in 2025 for direct collaboration with U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)¹⁷¹.
• Deep Integration and Training: Joby has moved far beyond simulators. It has successfully trained U.S. Air Force pilots to fly its aircraft, a critical step for genuine operational integration¹⁷².

We have already mentioned Joby a couple of times in this section to contrast the confused strategy by Archer, but the following provides a comprehensive side-by-side of the two, arguing that Joby’s methodical, engineering-first approach has positioned it to deliver a high-quality, mission-ready product well ahead of Archer. The following table presents that comparison, with green indicating stronger performance, amber indicating inferior performance, and red indicating concerning aspects.

The contrast in strategy and execution between Joby and Archer could not be clearer. Joby has the track record, has proven long range flight before, has an open book timeline, and is putting a hybrid powertrain on a product with thousands of flight hours. Joby’s larger fleet also provides greater flexibility; dedicating an aircraft to a new R&D program represents a smaller proportional risk than it would for Archer, which has fewer airframes to spare from its primary certification efforts. Archer’s opportunity cost on the air taxi side of the business is a staggering three times greater than what Joby will experience given an identical strategy of reconfiguring their “core technology” as Archer’s CTO put it. Joby could even use its non-conformal, but still operational aircraft such as was done with the hydrogen demonstration. Said a different way, Joby can enter this venture at very little opportunity cost while Archer’s must pay a king’s ransom to even dabble in hybridization on full scale aircraft.

Furthermore, the DoD’s desired capabilities, as outlined by RAND, align far more closely with Joby’s demonstrated performance. The baseline battery version of the Joby S4 has superior range, speed, and endurance over the Archer Midnight make the S4 a more viable platform for the military’s identified needs than the Midnight. This inherent capability gap, combined with Joby’s deep operational integration, strongly suggests a higher likelihood of securing future contracts.

Joby’s most significant competitive advantage lies in its proven mastery of advanced propulsion systems. In a world-first achievement, Joby flew a hydrogen-electric demonstrator, a converted S4 prototype, on a record-breaking 523-mile flight¹⁹¹, later extending that record to 561 miles¹⁹². As the only OEM to have demonstrated long-range hybrid eVTOL flight, Joby has proven its capability, not just promised it.

This demonstrated success makes Joby’s recently announced partnership with defense prime L3Harris Technologies a logical and lower-risk evolution as compared to Archer. The collaboration will produce a gas turbine hybrid VTOL aircraft based on the proven S4 platform, a strategy consistent with the company’s own imagery. Development will be further accelerated by Joby’s subsidiary, XWing, an industry leader in autonomous flight technology acquired in June 2024¹⁹³ which has been consistent at hitting milestones with the DoD on autonomous flight¹⁹⁴, daily flight cadence and remote operation from 3,800 miles away¹⁹⁵. Given Joby’s track record of delivering on promises, and their advanced standing, not only with their baseline battery aircraft but also with their hybridization experience and autonomous flight subsidiary, the probability of meeting its self-imposed timeline, flight tests in Fall 2025 and operational demonstrations in 2026¹⁹⁶, is exceptionally high. Moreover, looking forward to 2026, Joby is in a place to conduct operational demonstrations in 2026 because the base aircraft’s flight envelope has been expanded, allowing a focus on mission testing, not early R&D flight test. The same cannot be said about Archer, with the most recent Midnight (M001 SN001) having only flown CTOL, it has not explored the overwhelming majority of the flight envelope¹⁹⁷, and will be mired in proving out the envelope on this latest configuration for quite some time yet.

All-In-All, a High-Risk Diversification and Competitive Dead End for Archer

To conclude, the evidence strongly suggests that Joby is not just leading the race; it is running on a different track altogether and is poised to deliver a superior, mission-ready defense product well ahead of Archer. We think Adam Goldstein’s choice to place the defense opportunity “front and center” over the air taxi role before maturing the design and establishing a reasonable prototype fleet size is ill-advised and will result in the 2+ year gap between these two companies on the air taxi development front to substantially widen. Perhaps desperate times call for desperate measures.

Part VII: The eIPP Favors Joby Over Archer

The U.S. government is launching an Electric Vertical Take-off and Landing (eVTOL) Integration Pilot Program (eIPP) to advance the integration of these new aircraft into the national airspace. This program will select at least five pilot projects across the country to begin initial operations, providing a crucial platform for companies to demonstrate their technological and operational capabilities to federal regulators and the public. While this initiative is designed to benefit the entire eVTOL industry, its structure and timing appear poised to disproportionately favor Joby Aviation over Archer Aviation.

eIPP Implementation Timeline

The program’s rollout is scheduled on an accelerated timeline:

• No later than September 4^th, 2025: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is expected to issue a public Request for Proposals (RFP) to State, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments.
• No later than December 3^rd, 2025: Deadline for proposal submissions (90 days after RFP release).
• No later than March 3^rd, 2026: The FAA will announce the selection of at least five pilot projects (within 180 days of the submission deadline).
• No later than June 1^st, 2026: Selected projects are expected to commence eVTOL operations (within 90 days of selection).

Competitive Analysis: The Joby Advantage

While Archer is expected to be among the selected projects, the eIPP is structured in a way that will likely highlight its technical and operational weaknesses, and showcase Joby’s significant lead. Whilst ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’ ought to be a boost for Archer too, in relative terms this will become an opportunity for Joby to pull ahead of the pack even more than it already is. The program will effectively become a stage for Joby to solidify its market dominance for several key reasons.

Ultimately, the eIPP will serve as an accelerator for Joby’s entry into service. The program provides a formal, government-assessed platform for Joby to prove its superior product, operational maturity, and customer readiness. This public demonstration of its capabilities will likely extend Joby’s competitive lead, solidifying its market position and reinforcing the prediction that direct competitors like Archer will struggle to compete in the medium to long-term.

Conclusion

Founder of ValueWorks, Charles Lemonidas, gave a decent, but charitable summary on Archer on CNBC Television’s YouTube channel¹⁹⁸: “Joby is much further along by every objective metric”, finishing the interview with “when it comes to looking at the two of them [Joby and Archer], one of them has done a better job of getting the planes in production, or aircraft in production, and I think Archer has been built with the US stock market in mind and I think Joby has been built with the prospect of actually having a business in mind”. That is a nice way of putting exactly what we have found too.

Archer get off way too lightly. The company is rarely asked the tough questions and on rare occasions where they need an explainer, employ careful wording (i.e. certification progress) or cover stories (i.e. 4-bladed aft propellers) to obscure the truth.

Stock analysts, current and prospective investors, and partnering companies, to ensure accountability, should be asking Archer for explicit answers to the following questions:

1. What is the actual progress for Type Certification? When a Shareholder letter claims 13% or 15% of documentation progress, how does this translate to progress across the whole Type Certification process? The company should give investors clear information about Archer’s actual progress in the certification journey.
2. Provide investors with detailed information on your actual flight testing. How many flights has N302AX completed? How many hours has it been airborne? How many miles flown? What maximum speed has it achieved in testing? What was its longest-range mission flown? Joby Aviation openly reports these metrics, but Archer does not. Archer can and should do better. Archer’s investors should not tolerate being denied such basic metrics of progress.
3. Where are the “6+ conformal aircraft” announced in 2022 that were meant to be entering ‘for credit’ flight test in 2024? Why is there only one non-conformal prototype, three years later? The claim of producing ‘up to 10 aircraft’ in 2025 implies a figure close to 10. We are halfway through the year and only see 1 produced (N703AX). How can Archer credibly scale from one aircraft every one to two years to a monthly production rate, which still would not meet the stated target of ten at the end of this year?
4. Noise: Archer claims its aircraft is 100 times quieter than a helicopter, but there are open-source noise surveys that say quite the opposite; Midnight appears in noise simlar to  a helicopter in hover, which is where noise matters most. We acknowledge noise levels are lower in cruise, but this is not nearly as important for an air taxi operating in close proximity to populations with a VTOL mission profile. At the moment, Archer is riding on Joby’s coattails regarding noise, allowing Joby to display how quiet an eVTOL can be, but not showing their own noise profile in the hover. Given M001 (N703AX) has yet to hover, will Archer provide investors with noise measurements and sensor distances for MidZero (N302AX) in an out-of-ground-effect (OGE) hover? What are the cabin noise levels expected for passengers?
5. Clarify the changes in aft ‘lifter’ propeller blade counts. Why the changes from 3-bladed props (Maker) to 4-bladed props (MidZero flight) to 2-bladed props (Midnight M001 SN001 CTOL / MidZero display configuration / marketing content), now to a 4-bladed X-configuration? Clearly, there are technical difficulties with this part of the design, and it is failing to mature at the same rate as the rest of the aircraft. Investors should press management on this red flag, what are the delays, when will the new blades first fly, and when will FAA documentation reflect this major design change?
6. Release more comprehensive flight footage from Abu Dhabi. Investors need to see more than a single hover to be convinced anything meaningful is occurring. Can Archer demonstrate substantive testing, or was this simply a hover PR stunt?

On a final note: What is the point of Archer Midnight as a product? At a price of $5M, it is not cheap, a new H125 helicopter can be purchased for less. It has more gearboxes than any eVTOL, airplane or helicopter in the entire world. It cannot fly faster, further or carry more payload than any helicopter in its weight class or budget. Moreover, based on current evidence, it is not even quieter than a helicopter where it matters: approaches, hovering and departures. To be equally critical, Joby’s S4 will not outperform helicopters in every metric, but it clearly excels in several key areas. It is genuinely quieter, especially where it matters most, takeoff and landing in urban areas. The simplicity of the design with few motors, all of which are direct drives, gives credibility to forecasts of low operating costs for the Joby S4. Joby appears to be reporting honestly, open to showing their design including open-source measurements with external agencies, and has no red flags in their design to question their trustworthiness over.

The Archer Aviation Midnight is the epitome of lipstick on a pig. And so is Archer as a company, which puts style over substance. Their fixation on marketing is evident in the latest Abu Dhabi display. There are too many unanswered questions, inconsistencies, cover-ups, and red flags, all pointing to the same direction. Whether the eVTOL industry ultimately succeeds or fails is unclear, but it is obvious that if the industry does succeed, Archer’s Midnight will be trounced by its American competition in the Joby S4 and Beta Alia. Some may argue it is not about being first to market and that there is room for multiple players. We do not think so, not with Archer’s record of misrepresentation, delayed progress, undisclosed redesigns, poor aircraft performance and high production costs relative to the Midnight’s peers. Not with leadership that prioritizes PR at the expense of engineering. Archer’s trajectory mirrors Nikola Corporation’s, and is likely to end the same way.

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